

[Updated: May 17, 2010, 9:30 am]

CALL FOR PAPERS, ABSTRACTS, & SCHEDULE

"Eclipse of Empires: Colonial Resistance, Metropolitan Decline, and Imperial Crises in the XIX and XX Centuries"

Barcelona: June 2-3, 2010

I.) Conference Title: "Eclipse of Empires: Colonial Resistance, Metropolitan Decline, and Imperial Crises in the XIX and XX Centuries."

Possible Publication Title: "Endless Empires: Resistance, Crisis, and Dominion in the Modern Global System."

II.) Date: Wednesday and Thursday, June 2-3, 2010.

III.) Venue: Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain

IV.) Intellectual Direction and Publication Plans:

At this troubled historical moment, an international group of scholars -- based primarily at the universities of Pompeu Fabra, Sydney, and Wisconsin -- are convening a conference at Barcelona in mid 2010 that will, through a multi-faceted analytical agenda, explore the "Eclipse of Empires: Colonial Resistance, Metropolitan Decline, and Imperial Crises in the XIX and XX Centuries." Not only will this conference engage empires across the span of two centuries, but its timing marks the bicentennial of epochal events: both 1810-1812 (launching of Latin American independence movements) and 1812 (the first liberal constitution in Spain.)

This conference is the culmination of a three-phase enterprise involving an international dialogue within a kaleidoscopic assembly of over a hundred scholars scattered across four continents. Launched in 2006, the first phase entailed an international conference at Madison, Wisconsin on the Spanish-American imperial transition after 1898 with 47 papers, recently published as *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State* (2009). Phase Two in mid-2008 comprised an expanded series of seminars at Sydney and Manila, aimed at analyzing the impact of colonial periphery upon the metropole and exploring these imperial transformations in a comparative international context.

In Phase Three, to be convened at Barcelona in mid 2010, this loose scholarly community will explore the broad topic of imperial crisis, decolonization, and its aftermath. Viewing imperialism as an historical constant and empires as ever-changing, the conference will examine the dynamics of imperial transitions over the past two centuries through a range of case studies including, but not limited to, the dissolution of modern global empires, hemispheric transitions, and bi-lateral decolonization.

Among the cases that might merit attention are the contested break-up of global empires such as Spain's (1824, 1828, 1898), and Britain's (1783, 1947); the negotiated

withdrawals within the US imperium (Philippines, Germany and Japan); and the severance of bi-lateral colonial ties involving powers such as Germany (1918), Italy (1940s), France (1802, 1954, 1965), Netherlands (1949), Belgium (1962), or Portugal (1970s). Beyond these particular instances, discussions might focus on the critical moments of imperial crisis: 1783-1824 (Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal); 1898 (Spain's insular colonies); 1918 (Germany in Africa and the Pacific); 1947-1954 (Britain and France), and the 1970s-1980s (Portugal and Soviet Union). Within this dizzying diversity of empires, we might avoid redundancy with other conferences or edited collections by focusing, significantly but not exclusively, on colonial succession and decolonization in the Spanish and U.S. empires, which seem to have been overlooked in earlier symposia with similar themes.

Within these two centuries of imperial transition, we hope to talk not only about how empires decline but how they typically succeed each other. Among these broad themes of imperial decline and crisis, we seem to be speaking more about metamorphosis and change: Empire by another name and in new forms, with eclipse eliding into imperial makeover. Even as we consider decolonization (mindful of Wm. Roger Louis and Prasenjit Duara), we thus see this process as more comma than period. This emphasis on eclipse rather than erasure of empires builds upon Josep Fradera's sweeping essay in the *Colonial Crucible* volume, though adding multiple successions across the globe in areas not covered in detail by earlier phases of this project.

Across this broad, potentially unbounded historical terrain, we seek a thematic delimitation that preserves a broad temporal cum geographical inclusiveness while allowing the coherence necessary for intellectual innovation. Within the broad topic of imperial decline, we will explore aspects or comparisons, broad and narrow, that will lead to a collective understanding of imperial transitions across the arc of these two centuries comparing, say, the 1820s, the 1890s, the 1950s, the 1980s, and, counterfactually, 2020 or 2050--balancing autochthonous metropolitan forces with questions about the colonial citizens' participation in bringing down empires. Since no empire ever went without resisting its demise, but most also dissolved during and after international conflicts involving world powers, the central question can be best phrased: In comparing the end of empires across the globe from 1800 to the present, what do we know and what can we still learn about the balance between the internally corrosive forces and those that were imposed from the outside by events in the international arena? How did these two dimensions--internal resistance and international conflict--articulate in each case, and what generalizations can we make about this process?

We have spent countless millions of words on trying to grasp contemporary processes of globalization, yet discussion of this phenomenon has been largely limited to the latter decades of the twentieth century. Some scholars have argued, in a "world-systems" way of seeing things, that globalization processes have been ongoing since the sixteenth century and perhaps earlier, unleashing forces that contribute to these imperial transitions.

Within this larger process or problem of imperial transitions, one interesting set of questions, that remains but partially explored, is the relationship between imperial information systems and global integration via communications networks. One can certainly make a case for military imperatives (à la Jonathan Winkler) as leading the

process of global communications, yet, clearly, the ability to create communications networks has always relied, too, on imperatives drawn from imperial governance and imperial economics. One could argue that discussion of this dynamic has never gone much outside the circles of historians of the global empires of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries--that is, excluding both the remnants of the old mercantile empires (i.e., Spain and Portugal) and the ultimate "non-imperial empire": the United States. Establishing a conversation between these two camps may result in an interesting exchange.

In reflecting on information and imperial eclipse, we might begin at the macro or holistic level, elaborating upon work by C.A. Bayly ("Empire and Information"), Ann Laura Stoler ("Haunted by Empire"), and James C. Scott ("Seeing Like a State"). Some papers might engage in focused yet synoptic studies, both individual and comparative, of distinctive information systems that were often the central element in imperial dominion in the modern age, drawing upon the theoretical insights of these scholars while adding an empirical depth, comparative breadth, and the possible theoretical advances that might arise from conjuncture of these two. Depending on time and circumstance, colonial governments were often far more aggressive in their data collection than their metropolitan counterparts, deploying a variety information tools that were often rigorously systematic and sometimes methodologically innovative across a broad spectrum of disciplines--archeology, demography, botany, cartography, criminology, ethnography, ecology (agronomy, forestry), epidemiology, geography, philology, photography, and zoology. Moreover, empires were often innovative in their data collection for both routine administration or ongoing pacification employing census, social survey, and police surveillance. Not all empires gave information or particular forms of information the same weight, lending perhaps a particular character to distinctive data systems within each empire. Crisis could often prove the ultimate test of imperial information systems, forcing mobilization of data for policing or pacification, media management in defense of the imperial project, or dissemination of disinformation about dissidents.

These dissidents, both metropolitan reformers and anti-colonial radicals, were similarly creative in mobilizing information, expropriating imperial media and information networks to critique current dominion and advocate alternatives. If Kipling used the novel to celebrate the raj, Douwes-Dekker used the same literary form to urge reform of Dutch rule and Rizal employed it to condemn Spanish colonialism. Imperialists deployed linguistics and cultural studies to find fulcra for control; nationalists used both to create the instruments of nationhood. More broadly, dissidents quickly learned that they need to play upon fissures in the international system to seek refuge, disseminate their critiques, and build an opposition, often creating extraordinarily elaborate transnational networks. At times of crisis and decolonization, there is often another crucial matter: the inheritance of all the former empire had forged, sometimes over a span of centuries, such censuses, tax obligations, anthropological knowledge, and languages spoken. Considering the legacy of imperial information systems might correct a significant oversight since the study of informational aspects of empire often overlooks the ways that colonial information is transmitted to newly independent states.

All of this information management and literary outpouring, official and oppositional, was often directed at shaping public opinion which could play a critical role

in imperial policy during times of crisis--notably in Spain during the 1890s, France after 1954, and the U.S. in the 1960s. Public opinion often influenced the metropole's response to imperial crisis, fostering both mass opposition and inner contradictions within elite circles. Focusing on this factor and the groups that worked actively to shape public opinion (societies promoting abolitionism, humanitarian values, protection of aboriginals, or religious cleavages) is a way to avoid seeing empires only as an extended state, a bureaucratic machine somehow disconnected from society.

At the more general level we also wish to consider a third factor beyond colonial resistance and global crisis: metropolitan exhaustion in its many forms--moral, material, and intellectual. By introducing this third dimension, we capture an elusive analytical agility, evident in our first Madison conference back in 2006 and the subsequent edited volume, which allowed us to move our focus from colony, through global system, to metropole, and back again.

To bound this broad problematic of comparative imperial decline, we are specifying both chronological boundaries and thematic foci. After limiting ourselves to the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, albeit with a certain flexibility at either end, we will focus thematically on broad questions of: (1.) competing information strategies during imperial crisis; (2.) imperial overstretch in terms of cost, armies, or bureaucratic capacity that fosters an external crisis; and, (3.) resistance, whether within metropolises or in the far-off tropics, whether manifest as nativism (Islamic, Hindu, or other cultural revivals) or anti-colonial secular nationalisms, fomenting an internal exhaustion.

To add an element of specificity, we might explore these three broad themes through a series of sub-topics that engage:

(a.) the processes of imperial decline as a global politics moving from colony to metropole and back again;

(b.) transitions within the global system, as waning empires recede, and new ones advance;

(c.) specific case studies or paired comparisons of the eclipse of global maritime empires, contiguous domains, and single-territory overseas dominions;

(d.) the processes that allow prior forms of empire metamorphose into more contemporary neo-colonial forms of dependency like agro-biotechnology, international media conglomerates, and corporate finance;

(e.) the material and military overreach, the Paul Kennedy thesis, as perhaps a significant but not sufficient explanation of imperial decline;

(f.) the differential global flow of information within this process of imperial retreat, exemplified by the nationalist critique, waning imperial hegemony, and mass-mediated exposés of imperial excess;

(g.) the dialogic circuits of dominion and dissent including official imperial information, metropolitan reformist critiques, and resistance networks that disseminate a radical alternative, often through transnational media;

(h.) the way that historical perception of past imperial declines shapes the present, both recovering and distorting the past to engender caution or hubris, and;

(i.) the past as prologue or predictive paradigm, acknowledging that the present whispers quietly into our ears as we cast our eyes backward, making the globe's current imperial crisis the inevitable context for our seemingly detached retrospective deliberations.

Reflecting our conference site in Barcelona, a session on Spanish imperial decline might lend a certain concreteness to these reflections by covering several crisis and transformations: first, 1808-1824, the breakdown of the greater overseas empire; then, 1868 and later, the beginning of Cuban and Philippine wars, conspiracies and reforms of late nineteenth century, and imperial recession of 1898-1902 which transfers the overseas empire to the United States; and, finally, the shifting imperial interest in Africa.

In our collective aspiration for an original synthesis, or at least a significant scholarly contribution to understanding these historical processes, we are asking that all participants offer an original, unpublished paper. Since we are hoping to publish these deliberations in both English and Spanish editions, with either identical or overlapping content, we ask that all conferees understand that participation at Barcelona implies commitment to revising the conference paper for original publication in these edited volumes.

V. EMERGING THEMES FROM CALL & ABSTRACTS:

Through this process of engaging an impossibly large topic, there is a certain coherence emerging among themes, problems, and geographical bounds. First, among the multiplicity of modern empires for possible study, there seems to be a focus among paper givers on British, French, Spanish, and Portuguese empires, along with a comparative reflection on the Netherlands Indies.

Next, there seem to be three very broad themes emerging from our "call for papers" and the sum of the abstracts: (1.) competing information strategies during imperial crisis, (2.) imperial overstretch and the dynamics of decline; and (3.) resistance.

Moreover, in the interstices between these larger themes there are a host of more focused topics emerging such as: (a.) the broad geopolitics of imperial dominion and transition; (b.) local elites as agents negotiating these imperial transitions, dealing with global powers, developing democracies, or imagining an ideological response to a new age; (c.) changing conceptions of race and citizenship midst imperial crisis and decline; (d.) metropolitan responses to imperial transition and/or loss; and, (e.) post imperial dominion over a "back door" imperium (e.g. Spain in North Africa, France in West Africa and the South Pacific, and the US in the Caribbean). There are also several potential sub-themes such as science and historiography/literature emerging from those papers that seem to focus on a specific academic work or theme as opposed to purely empirical studies.

Exploring the intersection of imperial decline and changing identity, several papers focus on problems of race and citizenship in the global context of decolonization--including those by Joya Chatterji (*From Subjecthood to Citizenship in South Asia*), and Ana Cristina Silva ("*Natives who were Citizens and Natives who were Indigenous.*")

From abstracts submitted by Robert Aldrich (Sydney University) and Gregory Barton (Macquarie University), the arena of "back door imperialism" or "informal empire" is emerging as a major theme of this conference. In the era after formal empire, there are interesting comparisons with, say, the US in the Caribbean (1898 to present),

France in West Africa (1957 to present), and Spain in North Africa (1912-1956) that these papers are, to varying degrees, addressing.

At an analytical level, there is something quite distinctive about the arts of dominion in these territories at the “back door” of emerging or declining empires that this conference might tease out as one of its contributions. In the context of this conference, the precursor for this form of dominion was arguably Spain in Morocco (1912-56) and the US in the Caribbean since 1898. In its post-1957 interventions in francophone West Africa, France has by no means been unique in the maintenance of what we might call, for want of better words, a “back door imperium” or a “back door empire.” The US has shuttled in and out of the Caribbean and Central America in like manner for over a century; Russia seems to have reacted to the loss of the Soviet empire much as France did in West Africa, witness Ossetia and Ukraine; and China seems to be building a parallel sphere, most evident in Burma but in the germ elsewhere in Southeast Asia. In sum, during the half century since the end of formal empire, the major powers seem to have adopted this form of regional dominion as a key aspect of power projection that contradicts the concept of an international community meeting as co-equal sovereign states before the United Nations.

Depending upon the shape of the final papers, the conference might compare the concepts of “back door empire” and global/U.S. imperium since these seem to be the two principal types of post-World War II empire under discussion. There might be either a convincing complementation or some tension between the two concepts.

More broadly, Stephen Jacobson introduces a theoretical frame of “micromilitarism” that will prove a useful one for engaging another important dimension of imperial decline. The conference is engaging a range of military responses to imperial eclipse--including, the “micromilitarism” evident in Mexico (1862) or Grenada (1983), as well as a post-imperial tenacity in holding imperial fragments in the form of far-flung territories whether in North Africa, West Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. Of equal utility, Gregory Barton explores the concept of “informal empire” as a conceptual bridge from Great Britain at its apogee to a more fluid contemporary international community. A conceptual elision of “micromilitarism” and “informal empire” might move us toward a template for comparative analysis of imperial transitions over the past two centuries.

While the clustering of papers for conference panels will probably emerge quite logically from these categories, the introductory essay for the projected conference volume requires some strategizing to reach a working consensus about its possible parameters. In broad terms, I suggest that we follow the format for our last conference volume “Colonial Crucible” which involved simultaneously distilling both panels/chapters and individual papers, while elevating the discussion of each topic to level of abstraction beyond their self-evident frames. More broadly still, that introduction then took another step by aspiring to a synoptic statement about the distinctive character of the emerging U.S. imperial enterprise and its impact upon American state formation in the first half of the twentieth century. In effect, we used a multi-faceted survey of the U.S. colonial periphery as lever to raise a new interpretation of state power at the epicenter of the American metropole.

To frame an introductory essay for the current conference volume, we might consider a strategy similar to the one we used for “Colonial Crucible.” In sum, we might start by assaying this past on its own terms, in all its nuance and multifaceted

complexity, exploring a range of topics from the emergence of new identities and the role of national elites through the varieties of metropolitan response to imperial loss.

Then we might, as historian Piers Brendon suggests in the *New York Times* (February 25, 2010), discern the shape of future global hegemony from “the trajectory of earlier great powers.” Though he, like Paul Kennedy, admits the possibility that “the United States will shrink relatively in wealth and therefore in power,” his appropriation of nay-saying analogies from Rome (agricultural economy vs. U.S. industrial power) and Britain (small island vs. large American continent) seems somehow inadequate to the demands of this analytic task. He faults Kipling for premature musings about how “far-called our navies melt away” in 1897 when “the British empire was at its apogee.” Perhaps. But even at that early date Britain’s was not a simple triumph but a florescence, with the seeds of decline already germinating midst the celebration of Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee. Though we can critique Brendon’s answers as tired or even trite, this is still a timely question which commands our attention and invites an answer. In our explorations of the processes and politics of decline in four or five antecedent empires, we might therefore develop an understanding, even a model for assaying the shape of contemporary global hegemony and the dynamics of America’s future decline.

VI. PAPER PRESENTERS (25):

AUSTRALIA & ASIA:

Robert Aldrich (University of Sydney)
 Warwick Anderson (University of Sydney)
 Tony Ballantyne (University of Otago)
 Gregory Barton (Macquarie University)
 Hans Pols (University of Sydney)

EUROPE:

Greg Bankoff (University of Hull)
 Joya Chatterji (University of Cambridge)
 Remco Raben (Utrecht University)
 Emmanuelle Saada (Columbia University)
 Ana Cristina Silva (Universidade Nova de Lisboa)

SPAIN:

Albert Garcia Balanyà (UFP)
 Josep Delgado (UFP)
 María Dolores Elizalde (CSIC Madrid)
 Josep M Fradera (UPF)
 Stephen Jacobson (UPF)
 Florentino Rodao (Madrid)

AMERICAS:

Greg Grandin (New York University)
 Courtney Johnson (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
 Alfred McCoy (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
 Kelvin Santiago (Binghamton University)
 Christopher Schmidt-Nowara (Fordham University)
 Francisco Scarano (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

Mauricio Tenorio (University of Chicago)
Gary Wilder (City University of New York)

VII. PANELS & PARTICIPANTS (Tentative-5/11/10):

ARRIVAL: Tuesday, June 1, 2010

ACCOMMODATION: All participants will stay at the Residencia Campus del Mar (Pg. Salvat Papasseit, 4 / tel: 93 390 4000)

VENUE: All conference sessions will take place at the auditorium in the Mercè Rodoreda Building on Wellington Street at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Ciutadella Campus)

Informal Drinks (Meet at Residencia Campus del Mar): 7:30-8:30 pm

Dinner (no host; reservations provided by Conference): 9:00 pm

DAY ONE: Wednesday, June 2, 2010

Information and Welcoming Session: 8:30am - 9:15am

Conference Information: Josep Maria Fradera and Stephen Jacobson

Welcome: Rector or Vice Rector, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF)

Session No. 1, 9:15-11:15 a.m., June 2:

Title: “Decline and Succession Among Modern Empires”

Chair: Juan Pan-Montojo, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

Papers:

Gregory Barton (Macquarie) {*Informal Empire, Elites & Imperial Controls*}

Josep M Fradera (UPF) {*Empires in Retreat: Spain and Portugal, 1810-70*}

Kelvin Santiago (Binghampton) {*Comparing UK & US Imperial Decline*}

Coffee Break: 11:15-11:30 am

Session No. 2, 11:30am-1:30 pm, June 2:

Title: “Spain’s Long Imperial Recessional”

Chair: Francisco Scarano (Wisconsin)

Papers:

Josep Delgado (UPF) {*Spanish Imperial Collapse, 1762-1821*}

Albert Garcia Balanyà (UPF) {*Colonial Crisis & Local Politics Inside Spain*}

Stephen Jacobson (UPF) {*Micromilitarism & Eclipse of Spanish Empire*}

Florentino Rodao (Madrid) {*Biopolitics & Late Spanish Imperialism*}

Lunch Break: 1:30am -2:30 pm

Session No. 3, 2:30-4:30 pm, June 2:

Title: “Spain-U.S. Imperial Transition in Latin America & Philippines”**Chair:** Prof. Vina Lanzona (University of Hawai'i Manoa)**Papers:**

María Dolores Elizalde (CSIC Madrid) {*Colonial Discourse, Philippine Books*}
 Greg Grandin (NYU) {*American Exceptionalisms, Inter-American Relations*}
 Courtney Johnson (Wisconsin) {*Filipino Pan-Americanism & Imperialism*}
 Christopher Schmidt-Nowara (Fordham) {*Spanish Empire in US Post-1898*}

Coffee Break: 4:30am - 5:00 pm**Session No. 4, 5:00-7:00 pm, June 2:****Title: “Subjects into Citizens: Imperial Decline & National Identities”****Chair:** Juan Carlos Garavaglia (UPF-EHESS-Paris)**Papers:**

Joya Chatterji (Cambridge) {*Subjecthood to Citizenship in South Asia*}
 Ana Cristina Silva (U.N. de Lisboa) {*Citizen & Native in Portugal's Empire*}
 Mauricio Tenorio (Chicago) {*Empire, Race, & Mestizaje, Imperial Mexico*}

Wednesday, June 2, 2010, 9:00 pm:**Conference Dinner (Amaya Restaurant, La Rambla, 20-24)****<http://www.restauranteamaya.com/>****DAY TWO: Thursday, June 3, 2010****Session No. 5, 8:30-10:30 a.m., June 3:****Title: “Complexities & Contradictions of French Decolonization”****Chair:** Albert Carreras (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)**Papers:**

Robert Aldrich (Sydney) {*France & Ending of Empire*}
 Gary Wilder (CUNY) {*Decolonizing France: Senghor's African Socialism*}
 Emmanuelle Saada (Columbia) {*Fall and Rise of the French Empire*}

Coffee Break: 10:30-11:00 am**Session No.6, 11:00am-1:00 pm, June 3:****Title: “Information & Imperial Controls”****Chair:** Robert Fishman (UPF and University of Notre Dame)**Papers:**

Tony Ballantyne (Otago) {*Information in 19th Century British Empire*}
 Greg Bankoff (Hull) {*War Damages & New World Order*}
 Julian Go (Boston) {*US & European Imperial Formations Mid-20th Century*}
 Alfred McCoy (Wisconsin) {*Information, Imperial Hubris, US Global Empire*}

Lunch Break: 1:00 - 2:00 pm**Session No. 7, 2:00-4:00 pm, June 3:**

Title: “Elite Responses to Imperial Decline & Decolonization”**Chair:** Enric Ucelay-Da Cal (UPF)**Papers:**Remco Raben (Utrecht) {*Decolonisation & Democracy in Southeast Asia*}Francisco Scarano (Wisconsin) {*Imperial Nationalists in Spain’s Caribbean*}Warwick Anderson & Hans Pols (Sydney) {*Science & Nationalism in East Asia*}**Coffee Break: 4:00-4:15 pm****Session No. 8, 4:15-6:00 pm, June 3:****Title: “Eclipse of Empires: The Processes of Imperial Transitions”****Rapporteur:** Alfred W. McCoy (Wisconsin)**Response:** Josep M Fradera (UPF), Emmanuelle Saada (Columbia)**Despedida- Cava (Champagne) & Tapas: 6:00-7:30 pm****VIII. ABSTRACTS:****AUSTRALIA & ASIA:**Robert Aldrich (Sydney)--**Abstract [Msg. 1/29/10]***When Did Decolonisation End? France and the Ending of Empire*

Though accession of colonies to independence is generally seen to mark the conclusion of imperial rule, and most European countries wound up their empires in the 1960s or 1970s, the date at which the colonial era really ended is never clear. And the granting of independence did not mean that a colonial country cut ties – which critics often labelled ‘neo-colonial’ – with its former possessions. France provides an example of the way continued international connections blurred the divide between the colonial and post-colonial periods.

One French strategy was maintenance of close links with former colonies, especially in Africa. Most of France’s colonies in sub-Saharan Africa gained independence in 1960, yet for long afterwards Paris regarded these new nations (and Morocco and Tunisia as well) as its special preserve. The French African franc continued to be the local currency, French *fonctionnaires* advised and nurtured local leaders, the numbers of French expatriates sometimes grew larger than in the colonial period, French companies remained the major investors, the use of the French language was promoted through the movement of ‘*Francophonie*’, and French troops were deployed when Paris thought necessary. A special office in the presidential palace oversaw relations with what was sometimes called ‘*Françafrique*’. Even though these ties have now distended, criticism of France’s role in black Africa has been more loudly voiced, and other countries have challenged France’s predominance in the region, France still plays a major role in African affairs.

A second way in which France perpetuated a ‘colonial’ presence was through continued administration of a dozen overseas territories, from Martinique and Guadeloupe in the West Indies to La Réunion and Mayotte in the Indian Ocean, to French Polynesia and New Caledonia in the South Pacific. Mururoa

provided a nuclear testing site until the 1990s, and French Guiana hosts the French space station. Some 2.5 million French citizens live in the *oultre-mer*, and despite an independence movement in New Caledonia in the 1980s, and recurring social and political tensions elsewhere, these territories are championed as assuring resources ranging from minerals and tropical agricultural products to exclusive economic zones and centres for the spread of French culture.

Strong ties with former colonies and the integration of small but significant overseas territories into the Republic testify both to the determination that France keep its status as an international power and to the complex and persistent connections between France and the distant outposts over which it had established colonial control.

Warwick Anderson & Hans Pols (Sydney) --**Abstract [Msg. 1/18/10]**
Cosmopolitan Science and Nationalist Self-Fashioning in East Asia

Physicians and scientists dominated the first generation of nationalists in at least three East Asian colonies in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries: the Philippines (Spanish); the East Indies (Dutch); and Taiwan (Japanese). There is ample testimony that in each place scientific progress was perceived as intimately connected to decolonization—not only in a practical sense, but symbolically too. The first generation to receive training in biological science and professional ethics seems to have used this education to imagine itself as modern, progressive, and cosmopolitan. They saw themselves representing universal laws, advancing natural knowledge, and associating as equals with colleagues in Europe, Japan, and North America. Science gave them a new form of communication. Yet in the British Empire—in India and Malaya, for example—lawyers dominated decolonization struggles. How then did scientific training shape anti-colonialism and nationalism in the Philippines, the East Indies, and Taiwan? And why did the next generation of physicians and scientists fail to see this liberatory potential and instead become bureaucratic functionaries in colonial regimes?

Tony Ballantyne (Otago)--**Abstract [Msg. 12/20/09]**
Information, Intelligence, Empire: Rethinking the mid-nineteenth century crisis in the British Empire

This paper will explore the place of imperial information systems and communications networks during the crises -- the Matale rebellion in Ceylon in 1848; the Xhosa cattle-killing of 1856-7; the Santhal insurrection of 1855-6; the Indian rebellion of 1857-8; the Morant Bay rebellion of 1865; the New Zealand Wars between 1860-1872 -- that shook the British empire in the middle of the nineteenth century. These conflicts, which were energized by some significant trans-national flows of ideas and information, forced a re-calibration of imperial authority and widespread reforms in state practice in most British colonies during the 1860s and 1870s. Three issues will be at the heart of this paper: 1) the extent to which the ability of colonized groups to seriously challenge colonial authority was a product of imperial information systems and “intelligence failures” 2) the

role of intelligence-gathering in the suppression of rebellion and the reconstitution of state authority and 3) the nature of the new imperial knowledge order that emerged in the 1860s. By exploring the broad contours of these conflicts and the subsequent transformation of the empire, this paper will also assess the strength of C. A. Bayly's thesis about the role of imperial information systems in the Indian rebellion (and its aftermath) on the much larger analytical canvas of the British imperial system as a whole.

Gregory Barton (Macquarie)--**Abstract [Msg. 12/22/09]**

Informal Empire, Elites, and the Mechanism of Control

Historians in the mid-twentieth century introduced a new term into the vocabulary of political activists and academics alike, the term “informal empire.” Imperial historians, among others, have struggled with the validity of this term. Many argue that informal empire simply cannot constitute imperialism as the word is used: the rule of one people over another, or the extension of national boundaries over other regions. More specifically, informal empire lacks a defined and clear mechanism of control. The difficulty of the term, however, has not obscured its utility as witnessed by the fact that historians repeatedly return to the concept, using the term informal empire or allied terms to describe a vast theatre of action and influence without the formal structures of empire. This paper reviews how scholars have struggled with the term and then offers a defined understanding of elites and elite formation in a global context. Mapping a new definition will hopefully provide the conceptual tools necessary to better illuminate a mechanism of control for informal empire that historians in many fields will find useful.

EUROPE:

Greg Bankoff (Hull) --**Abstract [Msg. 5/17/10]**

The "Three Rs" and the Making of a New World Order: Reparation, Reconstruction, Relief and U.S. Policy, 1945-1952

Wars like all disasters of a natural or anthropogenic origin cause death and destruction but they also create opportunities and challenges. Even during the darkest days of World War Two, American and British officials were negotiating the terms of a new post-war world order. The trade and monetary agreements that were reached by Allied delegates at Bretton Woods in July 1944 both (re-)established an open world economy based on the principles of liberal multilateralism that satisfied U.S. economic concerns and recognised the legitimate rights of states to manage national economies in their own self-interests. It was a system widely acknowledged to benefit the United States of America more than other nations but it was also a realisation by American officials that building an economic order on a coercive basis would be far costlier and probably counterproductive.

Joya Chatterji (Cambridge)--**Abstract [Msg. 1/18/10]**

From Subjecthood to Citizenship in South Asia: Empire, Decolonisation and Mobility

The end of empire in South Asia raised important questions about the future of British subject hood. The partition of the subcontinent between the two successor nation-states of India and Pakistan also raised huge questions about belonging and citizenship in these new entities. This paper questions the widespread view that the two states took fundamentally different approaches to these questions, and show that the states of India and Pakistan share profound and remarkable, but almost wholly ignored, symmetries. It shows that these are not simply a legacy of the Raj and a common imperial past, but the product of complex processes, which occurred after they achieved independence. Bangladesh, too, after its secession from Pakistan in 1971, took a line on citizenship identical to those of its South Asian neighbors. These common characteristics, this book will argue, were profoundly influenced by the mass migrations which followed the partitions of 1947 and 1971, and by the efforts of all three countries – India, Pakistan and Bangladesh - to contain and manage them.

Remco Raben (Utrecht)--**Abstract [Msg. 2/26/10]**

Decolonisation and the Democratic Moment in Southeast Asia

A widely accepted view on the history of modern democracy is that it originated in the West and from there spread over the world. There are many problems with this contention. Some of the complexities can be illustrated by looking at the period of decolonization in Southeast Asia. Although Western democracies may have served as models, imperial powers were reluctant promoters of the democratic idea. And when at last call before independence democracies were installed, they were not mere copies from the West (and in the case of Indonesia not even established by the colonial government).

What were the main motives and motivators behind the establishment of democratic institutions? This paper will go into the history of democracy in Southeast Asia during the long transition from colonial to independent states. The development of democracy will be analyzed from three angles: the political conceptualization by political leaders; the formal democratic structures that were established under colonial rule and especially at independence; and the influence of the local practices of participatory politics.

Emmanuelle Saada (Columbia) --**Abstract [Msg. 1/22/10]**

The Fall and Rise of the (French) Empire?

The notion of empire never had much weight within the French political imagination or in its historical literature. Even at the high point of its overseas expansion in the 1930s, France more frequently as a nation with a series of colonies than as an empire. Many historical, political, administrative and cultural factors contributed to this denial. But almost fifty years after “decolonization”, the concept is more prevalent. As recent political developments in the Caribbean and the Pacific region suggest, the imperial legacy of France has proven remarkably durable.

In the past decade, there have been vigorous political and historiographical debates over the role of the imperial past in France’s present.

These have opened an unprecedented debate about the nature of the French national and imperial experience, but also tended to dilute the specificities of each colonial situation within the broader imperial project. This paper will try to explain both the neglect and resurgence of the notion of “empire” in the French context by analyzing the intellectual categories underlying them.

Ana Cristina Silva (Universidade Nova de Lisboa)

--Abstract [Msg. 12/21/09]

Natives who were Citizens and Natives who were Indigenous in the Portuguese Colonial Empire (XIX-XX Centuries)+

During the period before the abolition of slavery in Portuguese colonies circa 1875, the legal status of native peoples in the overseas territories was a very ambiguous one. Some of them were Portuguese citizens exercising plenty political rights, some others, although being declared full citizens in the Portuguese Constitution, were subjected to a lower civil status in the Portuguese legislation. They could also be considered non citizens but just “subjects of the Portuguese Nation, due to a conquest right”, as was stated by the author of the first Portuguese Civil Code (1867) while referring the non catholic native inhabitants of Portuguese colonial territories. However, after 1875 a new category emerged in Portuguese legislation which gained a growing importance in what concerned the legal classification of native people, the category of the *indigenous* native, as opposed to the citizen. The goal of this paper is to explain the process along which that legal category emerged in Portuguese Empire, as well as to describe the main criteria used to define the native who was a citizen and the native who was an *indigenous*. Other goal is to show how difficult was, for the Portuguese colonial administration, to establish the (racial and cultural) frontiers which allow to distinguish those natives who could be citizens from those who should be classified as *indigenous*.

SPAIN:

Albert Garcia Balaña (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

“Fatherland and Freedom”: Colonial Crises and the Shaping of Grassroots Politics in Metropolitan Spain (1859-1878)

The paper will address the neglected issue of the imperial dimension of popular politics in mid-Nineteenth-Century liberal Spain. It will focus on some relevant but hidden connections between two very different colonial crises, although not so different according to some metropolitan responses: the so-called “War of Africa” in northern Morocco (1859-1860) and the early years of the First Cuban War (1868-1878, mainly 1869-1870). Both crises shared policies of popular mobilization through civil militias raised to fight in Spanish “Ultramar” borders. By showing the twin cases of the “Catalan Volunteers” fighting in Morocco (1859-1860) and in Cuba ten years later (1869...), the paper will argue that metropolitan radical identities were also shaped by new cultural, racial and political dichotomies fed by changing colonial traditions and scenarios. Indeed, the paper will point up that all general explanations of late Spanish “Ultramar”

should consider this new set of popular expectations opened up by colonial mass wars in the age of nation-building.

Josep Delgado (UPF)--**Abstract [Msg. 11/19/09]:**

The Roots of Spanish Imperial Collapse. Bourbon reforms and the breakdown of consensus between Monarchy and Spanish American Elites (1762-1821)

Usually the recent historiography links the Spanish Imperial crisis with the critical sequence of maritime wars which destroyed the transatlantic maritime connections between the metropolis and the American Main in the late Eighteenth Century. But prior to these wars, Spanish colonial policy progressed in some ways which would bring the same result, without the necessity of a fatal military conjuncture. We will explain which factors worked from 1762 onwards -- fiscal, politics and economics -- to erode inter-imperial ties and also explore the role of British imperial power in this process.

María Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Gruoso (CSIC Madrid)--**Abstract [Msg. 3/18/10]:**
The Making of a Colonial Discourse on the Philippines: An Analysis Through 19th Century Travel Books

In the course of the 19th century, the Philippine Islands aroused the interest of the great powers with colonial ambitions. When imperialist expansion was at its height, the Philippines was an archipelago strategically located facing the China coast and at the crossing of several trans-Pacific routes. By that time, the Philippine islands had been transformed into an export economy, which sent a variety of tropical products of high demand to the international market. Investments in the export production of sugar, hemp, tobacco and other resources were required. Also, Filipino consumers turned out to be potential market for western products, initially textiles. For these developments to prosper, the infrastructure and communications had to be greatly improved. For all these reasons, merchants, investors, and travellers from different countries were increasingly attracted by the Philippines.

Foreign residents and travellers visited quite often the Archipelago in the nineteenth century. They wrote a large collection of recollections and reports about the islands. There are more than fifty travel books on the Philippines in the period 1850-1900, written by merchants, colonial administrators, officials posted in the colonial settlements, travellers around Asia, and scientists who studied Asian societies. All those authors and writers carried out interesting analysis about the features that defined the Spanish colonial rule over the Philippines. Many of them also pointed out several factors that made the Spanish model so different to other colonial systems in Asia.

This paper will focus on this diagnosis of the Spanish colonial regime in the Philippines. It will also analyse how those evaluations contributed to the development of a colonial discourse on the Philippines. Also it will try to show why and how twentieth-century historiography assumed or incorporated for such a protracted period this body of knowledge as part of its own perspective on the archipelago.

Josep M. Fradera (UPF)--**Abstract [Msg. 12/13/09]:**

Empires in Retreat: Spain and Portugal, 1810-1870

During the Napoleonic Wars, Spain and Portugal faded away from the exclusive club of the first-order empires. This change was in fact a major event in world history, one that can easily be related to the expansion of the Second British Empire. Nevertheless, the breakdown of the old Iberian empires in continental America did not mean by any means their total retreat from the colonial world. On the contrary, they successfully rebuilt and updated their remaining possessions through the common trends of enslaved and coerced labor, liberal exclusions, and particular régimes. The paper will try to assess both the meaning of this broader transformation and the changing processes within each of the two colonial frameworks, stressing both similarities and differences in these two historical cases.

Stephen Jacobson (UPF)--**Abstract [Msg.1/29/10]:**

Theatrical Micromilitarism and the Eclipse of the Spanish Empire during the Mid-Nineteenth Century

In a recently acclaimed book, the Cambridge-trained French historian Emmanuel Todd coined the term “theatrical micromilitarism” to describe various recent imperial adventures of the United States in which resounding military victories over small and weak states were achieved with limited casualties to American soldiers. He argued that such imperial adventures -- in which the high degree of domestic patriotic enthusiasm was inversely proportional to meaningful geo-political gains -- were the sign of an empire in decline, the desperate lurches of a dying beast. By focusing on Spain, this paper will explore the extent to which “theatrical micromilitarism” is endemic to the eclipse of empires. The paper will discuss the rise of a new imperial mentality created as a result of a series of military adventures in the mid-nineteenth century: Cochin China (1859), Morocco (1859-1860), Mexico (1862), Dominican Republic (1861-1865), and Peru and Chile (1864-66).

Previously, historians have examined these conflicts as the follies of an impotent and decadent state (Álvarez Junco) or the steps in the reconstitution and reorganization of formal and informal empire (Fradera). In contrast, this paper will focus on the manner in which these expeditions created a new imperial zeal that was inversely proportional to the country’s capacity to expand or defend its overseas possessions. It caused Spain to redirect its energies to Cuba in 1868, a project which came to a halt with the final loss of the island and other remaining colonial holdings in 1898.

Florentino Rodao (Madrid)--**Abstract [Msg. 12/29/09]:**

Biopolitics and Spanish Imperialism

The Spanish empire suffered two setbacks along its history, the second in 1898, when the United States seized the three islands remaining from the Latin American independences in early 19th Century--Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. I will try to understand this latest phase through the prism of

biopolitics, that is, the same forces that were partly behind the demise of the Spanish empire before 1898 were crucial in the Spanish reaction to it later in the 20th century. While Social Darwinism and the perception of Spain as a “dying country” was a crucial feature of the wars against Spain during the late 19th century, after it the word *Regeneration* encapsulated the Spanish aims after that –as opposite to *Degeneration*. During the 20th century, these ideas infused with a variant of imperial eugenics led, paradoxically, to an impassioned embrace of the imperial ideal in the half-century that followed--an embrace manifest by florescence of the Spanish community in Manila, Madrid's cultivation of such expatriate "colonies," and the alliance with ascendant German and Japanese empires in order to gain new territories.

The paper deals starts the imperialist ideas in Spain during the late 19th Century, in response to the increasingly influential theories of corporal differences and degeneration of races, either by praising mixture, by using bodily differences against other races or by attacking Chinese as scapegoats in the Philippines. After the Spanish-American war of 1898, Regeneration-through-Empire was behind the Spanish determination to expand in North Morocco, even after the defeat at Annual by the forces of Abd el-Krim in 1921--a colonial war which ended only after the dropping of poisonous gas-bombs. Besides the colonial wars, the paper studies the impact of the imperial ideas in the Spanish society, the increasing links, trade and emigration with Cuba and the Philippines and, finally, the expansionist ethos of the Francoist regime before, during, and after the Second World War. In a certain sense, Franco's later authoritarian regime was the Phoenix that rose from the ashes of empire, taking form in Morocco and flight through the civil war and the ill-considered alliance with the rising German and Japanese empires.

AMERICAS:

Julian Go (Boston)--**Abstract [Msg. 10/27/09/; 12/28/09]:**

Enchained Empires: The American and European Imperial Formations in the Mid-Twentieth Century

The idea that the United States empire after World War II emerged from the ashes of the European empires is pervasive. Supposedly, the United States emerged from the War as an exceptional empire bringing new economic and political forms to the world. Pushing to end the old European empires, the United States inaugurated a new order of open trade, national sovereignty and freedom, thereby becoming the new "anti-imperial" liberal empire to replace the older, seemingly anachronistic colonial empires of once powerful but now declining European states.

This common tale, however, overlooks how America's global power was facilitated by supporting and tapping into those European empires rather than dismantling them, and the violent processes by which the two imperial formations transitioned when they finally did. To realize its own global economic and security goals, the United States used economic aid and political support to keep the European empires alive. Outsourcing its imperial functions, the United States actively propped and deployed preexisting European colonial networks for

markets, materials and to construct its massive global security apparatus. This was thus an enchained relationship of inter-imperial networks. Only later, beginning in the late 1950s and through the early 1960s, did the enchained network begin to breakdown, thereby summoning military force (both overt and covert) to repair the holes and finally make for the "transition" from the older colonial powers to America's new informal empire. As the enchained empires were disentangled slowly, imperial power had to be reinstated forcefully.

Greg Grandin (NYU)--**Abstract [Msg.12/18/09]:**

American Exceptionalisms: Inter-American Relations as Immanent Critique

My paper will examine the idea of 'American exceptionalism,' a phrase that has been used either to argue that the US empire represents a unique kind of world power, able to project its authority free -- for the most part -- from the burden of direct colonialism or militarism; or to describe the motivational creed held by US policy makers and intellectuals that the United States is a rejuvenating agent of change in the world. I will argue that in all the debates on what is and is not exceptional about US power miss the one thing that does in fact make the US unique: Latin America.

Other modern capitalist empires -- France, Holland and Great Britain in Africa, Asia and the Middle East -- ruled over culturally and religiously distinct peoples. The Anglo-American settlers who colonized North America, by contrast, looked to Iberian America not as an epistemic 'other' but as competitor in a fight to define a set of nominally shared intellectual and political forms: Christianity, liberalism, republicanism, constitutionalism, democracy, and, above all else, the very idea of America. This focus on inter-American relations as "immanent critique" -- the process by which a thing is defined by its contradictions -- helps explain why the idea of democracy in Latin America has remained enduringly social, while liberalism in the US has become increasingly hollow and evangelical.

Courtney Johnson (Wisconsin)--**Abstract [Msg.3/2/10]:**

Prospero's Court: Filipino Pan-Americanism, Alliance Imperialism and the Emerging International Order

If in 1899, the sovereign aspirations of the Philippine Republic were first met with the iron fist of US infantry, US policymakers soon recognized the value of the velvet -glove strategies of soft power for quelling anti-imperialist indignation at home and armed resistance in the war zone. Similarly, on the heels of its participation in a punitive intervention in China, the United States led the other Great Powers to, at least tacitly accept the territorial principle of *status quo ante* as a basis for an international order regulated through arbitration rather than war as set out in the 1899 Peace Conference at the Hague and out of which emerged the Permanent Court of International Arbitration. A parallel shift from hard to soft-power tactics was also apparent in the foreign policy of the Theodore Roosevelt administration as a wave of anti-American pan-Hispanism swept the Spanish-speaking nations of the Western Hemisphere after 1898.

This anti-Yankee Hispanism was most influentially articulated by the Uruguayan writer José Enrique Rodó in his 1900 essay titled *Ariel*. Rodó framed the Yankee threat through re-interpretation of Shakespeare's *The Tempest* in which the heirs of Latin idealism —symbolized as Prospero's airy assistant Ariel in Shakespeare's play— was threatened by so many barbarous, materialist Calibans of the north. The "big stick" policies of the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, most visibly enforced in Nicaragua in 1904 led the normally politically quiescent Nicaraguan poet Rubén Darío to write a jeremiad against Roosevelt and to wonder aloud, "will we be delivered up to savage barbarians?/Will so many millions of us speak English?" Arielism, as this post-98 pan-Hispanist movement has been called, swept across the Americas and across the Atlantic to Spain and even permeated the literary and political sensibilities of the colonial Philippines. In Spain, Arielism was warmly received by a dispirited Spanish intelligentsia who had for decades labored to recover the Americas as a sphere of Spanish economic and cultural influence. Arielism was similarly attractive to independence-minded intellectuals who deliberately turned to Hispanism as a cultural weapon in their efforts to resist Americanization.

Perhaps no single figure was more active in this trans-Atlantic re-integration than the Spanish liberal jurist, social scientist and man of letters Rafael Altamira. Under the leadership of Altamira and other forward-thinking Spanish intellectuals, pan-Hispanism (and its American variant Arielism) were viable rivals to the US-led pan-American movement that languished in the wake of US gunboats.

If the Hispanists like Rodó and Darío were so many Ariels struggling mightily to remain unsoiled by the grubby materialism of Yankee Calibans, this allegory of geopolitical struggle begged the important question of the identity of Prospero, for in Shakespeare's play both Ariel and Caliban are equally enslaved to Prospero's magical powers. The purpose of this presentation is to suggest that Prospero's identity does indeed come into view as one follows the development and sudden evaporation of the rivalry between pan-Hispanism and pan-Americanism as models for international relations.

The pan-Hispanist revival was cut short by a savvy policy innovation by the United States Secretary of State Elihu Root who effectively supplanted the Roosevelt Corollary with a soft-power approach sometimes referred to as the "Root Doctrine." Root almost single-handedly resuscitated the pan-American movement by personally attending the Pan-American Congress in Rio de Janeiro. In Brazil Root announced the solemn commitment of the United States to the maintenance of the sovereign rights of all American states large and small. Root's visit to Rio and subsequent tour of Spanish American capital cities was so successful in winning the proverbial hearts and minds that Rubén Darío himself wrote a lengthy ode to the American eagle praising the United States and its president for its wise hemispheric leadership. But Root's diplomatic and geopolitical goals transcended the immediate need to countermand anti-Americanism in Spanish American political circles. His longer-range goals were focused on the emergence of the institutional framework of an emerging international order centered in the Hague.

To make the case I describe the sudden evaporation around 1916 of liberal pan-Hispanism in the Americas, Spain and even in the Philippines as the United States prepared to re-organize the colonial government in Manila through the Jones Law and as the United States itself sat on the precipice of taking sides in the European war. It was at about this time that many of the former Arielists and pan-Hispanists (including Altamira, Onís and other Spaniards began to cultivate their ties to the emerging pan-American-inspired field of Latin American studies in the United States. It was at this same time that Filipino Hispanists launched a public campaign in Washington, Manila and across the Spanish-speaking Americas in favor of including the Philippines in the Pan-American League as a sovereign republic. This aspiration explicitly anticipated the emergence of the League of Nations at war's end as a solution to the longstanding problem of an American protectorate over the Philippines. Finally, I follow the late career of Rafael Altamira who in 1922 was named a founding justice on the Permanent Court of International Justice under the auspices of the League of Nations toward which Elihu Root had devoted much of his professional and intellectual life.

Alfred McCoy (Wisconsin)--**Abstract [Msg.12/26/09]:**

Imperial Hubris: Information Infrastructure and America's Ascent to Global Power

This paper will explore the critical role of information in America's ascent from colonial ruler over of a disparate chain of tropical islands to the world's preeminent power. From the pacification of the Philippines after 1898 through the occupation of Iraq since 2003, there has been a marked continuity in the character of Washington's information order throughout this century of dramatic change marked by two global wars and dozens of regional conflicts. Building upon the foundation of America's first information revolution of the 1870s which allowed the rapid processing of unprecedented quantities of raw data, the US colonial regime in the Philippines amassed an expansive array of information for the pacification and administration of this volatile archipelago, the crown jewel in America's early insular empire. Within a putative spectrum of imperial epistemologies, the US imperial state has, throughout the 20th century, eschewed deep yet particularistic cultural knowledge and shown a consistent preference for amassing universal yet superficial data.

Despite marked increases in the mass and velocity of US information systems over the course of this violent century, there has been a discernible continuity in Washington's reliance upon masses of political, social, and geographical data for force projection and political dominion. Within this skein of evolving information systems, there has also been a marked epistemological continuity throughout a slow, subtle process of systemic mutation. Each sustained military conflict seems to absorb the full array of America's civil and military information capacities, amplify them in a crucible of conflict, and then reintegrate them into the metropolitan state as an expanded apparatus for social control. In marked contrast to the deeply rooted regimes of the high imperial age, the US regime has slowly reduced its alien footprint on foreign terrain, initially in the early 20th century through short-term territorial occupation by civilian

contractors and military secondment and, in more recent decades, through a slow levitation of the apparatus of global dominion into an ether of aerial surveillance and digital data controls. This paper will track the evolution of this distinctive imperial epistemology through its major transformations--from the pacification of the Philippines after 1898, the role of OSS in World War II and its aftermath, computerized combat in Indochina, and aerial cum digital pacification under the broad rubric of the Global War on Terror since 2001.

In the aftermath of America's first information revolution, exemplified by the first punch card census of 1890 and the parallel electrification of municipal police and fire communications, Washington applied its advanced data-management capacities to the conquest of the Philippines. Through an imperial synergy, information facilitated empire and empire in turn expanded information. In this first use of data management for political control, Washington applied its advanced information systems through the US army's descriptive cards for influential Filipinos, the Constabulary's pervasive Information Division, and massive Manila Police photo files. Illustrating the US preference for information over knowledge, US colonial administration amassed vast quantities of data through superficial, empirical surveys--photoreconnaissance, terrain mapping, population census, botanical taxonomy, ethnographic survey, historical compilation, and applied agronomy. To illustrate this point, the paper will survey the utilitarian nature of US imperial research in both encyclopedic handbooks and periodic journals, comparing US publications (*Philippine Craftsman*, *Philippine Journal of Science*) with their colonial counterparts in French Indochina (*BEFEO*) and British Malaya (*JMBRAS*).

In a second major transformation during World War II, Washington created the OSS as the nation's first civilian espionage agency, drawing in the nation's small coterie of foreign area experts, amplifying their skills, and then releasing them back into civil society to propagate as the founding generation of foreign area studies. To illustrate the continuity in US information systems throughout these decades of tempestuous global conflicts, this section will explore Human Relations Area Files (HRAF), the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), and the State Department's political reportage as exemplars of expanded data collection in service of global dominion. In a parallel postwar trend, the US expanded upon wartime psywar, preferring universal human psychology to manipulation of cultural particularisms.

In an third significant transformation, the US applied computerized data collection to the pacification of Indochina through three major programs--the CIA's Phoenix program for the covert eradication of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), the Hamlet Evaluation Survey (HES) to facilitate conventional military pacification, and Operation Igloo White's electronic battlefield of sensors for bombardment of North Vietnamese logistics in southern Laos. While the first two attempts at computerized pacification in South Vietnam failed because their information rested on social formations the US could not understand without the deep cultural knowledge it characteristically eschewed, Operation Igloo White, though failing in its immediate strategic objectives, showed the long-term potential of elevating combat operations into an extra-terrestrial ether of aerial

force projection. By integrating electronic sensors in lieu of “human intelligence,” drones in lieu of piloted aircraft, computerized targeting in lieu of visual contact, and satellite communications in lieu of land-based transmitters, Igloo White laid the foundations for the later development of aerial force projection via reduced terrestrial footprint. Moreover, the digital, sensor-generated “worm” on the Igloo White monitors at Nakorn Phanom represented a conceptual threshold, allowing the first bombardment based on digital data removed from any physical interaction with the target--whether sighting down a barrel, firing from a forward observer’s coordinates, or releasing depth charges at sonar blips.

In a fourth and final transformation, the US pacification of Iraq has relied upon retinal/iris scans for population control, electronic intercepts for assassination, and data mining for high-value targets such as Saddam Hussein. In Afghanistan, the US military applied aerial warfare on the Laos model to topple the Taliban and then conduct pacification from 2002 to 2008. As collateral damage from bombing produced civilian opposition, the US command corrected, shifting to more selective bombing, aerial drone assassination, and Human Terrain Teams comprised of contractors with just-in-time cultural expertise.

In contrast to Great Britain’s superseded empire of land and sea, Washington’s global reach thus seems bent on a century-long trajectory toward global hegemony through extra-terrestrial control of cyberspace, maritime depths, electro-magnetic spectrum, atmosphere, and exosphere. This success, should it be that, raises questions of whether this efficacious integration of information and coercion, in an apogee of “hard power,” can slow to the inexorable erosion of U.S. hegemony through soft-power losses of economic influence, technological eminence, and moral suasion. Moreover, this seeming flood of information can foster a self-referential illusion of omniscience and even omnipotence, building elaborate sand castles of data that are swept away in a rising tide of social change.

Kelvin Santiago (Binghamton)--**Abstract [Msg.1/4/2010]:**

Comparing the fin-de-siècles of Great Britain and United States: The crisis-ridden descent from the commanding heights of global imperialism”

This paper will examine the importance of rethinking studies of empire/ imperialism in terms of which world power exerts global hegemony during a particular historical period’s arts of domination, the latter understood in terms of the global-racial structuring of social-regulatory apparatuses and orders of knowledge. I will specifically compare the increasingly turbulent and crisis-ridden, protracted decline of British hegemony (1870s-1910s) with the comparably tumultuous, drawn out swan song of U.S. hegemony (1970s to the present), locating the *longue-durée* connections between both periods within the conceptual parameters proposed by Braudel.

The principal focus of this paired comparison would involve examining the broad structural parameters of the inter-linked and overlapping dominant knowledges and social control instrumentalities corresponding to each global hegemony with regards to how such knowledges/ mechanisms responded to, anticipated, understood, and attempted to domesticate various subaltern

populations and their wayward survival-strategies/ resistances. In other words, I plan to specifically concentrate on how such dominant knowledge-regulatory forms enacted their respective observation-description, information-gathering, and classification practices regarding these populations/ resistances in order to try to make the latter more visible, legible, and manageable. My examination of this interplay would include examples of the target "problem populations" involved and of their "desultory" survival strategies and anti-imperial disruptions. It is in this sense that my paper addresses the conference's goals of discussing the "balance" and "articulation" between "internally corrosive forces" and "outside/ international events" in order to identify "what generalizations we can make about this process."

Such empirical amassing of evidence creates the illusion of mastery and control, ignoring those deeper cultural dimensions of societies within its ambit. While such an information system, integrated into a matrix of power, have proven effective in achieving short-term objectives, but it contains the germ of hubris and an inclination to imperial overreach.

Christopher Schmidt-Nowara (Fordham)--**Abstract [Msg.12/15/09]**

{N.B.: *in absentia*}

A New Imperial Past: The Spanish Empire in the United States after 1898

The "splendid little war" of 1898 engendered new attitudes toward overseas empire in the United States, some critical, others celebratory. One aspect of this ideological transformation was a reconsideration of the history of the Spanish empire. As Iván Jaksic and Richard Kagan have demonstrated, in the nineteenth century, American historians such as William Hickling Prescott and George Ticknor dwelt at length on Spain and its global empire to draw lessons about church and state, religious freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. In their view, imperial Spain was the antithesis of the United States; it was a global empire quickly undone by religious bigotry, monopoly, and despotism. While these negative images of Spain remained alive and well, indeed war in 1898 accentuated them in the United States, victory and annexation transformed perceptions of the Spanish empire. After 1898, Americans came to see Spain not as antithesis but as predecessor.

This paper will explore American acts of affiliation with the Spanish empire in the aftermath of war with Spain and during the consolidation of rule and hegemony in the Caribbean and Pacific in the early twentieth century. Drawing upon archival records in Spain's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Royal Palace as well as printed sources, it will discuss how municipal governments, civic groups, and historians around the United States solicited Spanish participation in public acts that commemorated American origins in the Spanish imperial past. By examining the crafting of a historical lineage grounded in the Spanish conquests, this paper will argue that Americans sought to justify imperial expansion by endowing it with a venerable past. In doing so, it will address several of the conference themes related to the eclipse of empires: the inheritance of imperial knowledge, the role of historical perception in shaping

attitudes toward empire, and the impact of the imperial present on renderings of empires in the past.

Francisco Scarano (Wisconsin)--**Abstract [Msg.12/24/09]**

Imperialist Nationalists at the End of Spain's Caribbean Empire

Once regarded as colonial aberrations, petit-yankees in the making, Cuban and Puerto Rican proponents of U.S. statehood in the late nineteenth century were among the most influential local agents working to end the Spanish regime and replace it with U.S. rule. They were also among the most trusted members of the local intelligentsias recruited by U.S. forces to assist with the military and institutional transition. Typically well-educated, white(r) than most of their compatriots, and more informed in international affairs, often bilingual in English and Spanish, they easily gained the Americans' trust and were placed into positions of authority, displacing the more radical, popularly recruited members of rival nationalist camps. Recent scholarship concerning both nations has reassessed the role of these partisans of integration with the U.S., revisiting them, not simply as anti-nationalist facilitators of U.S. imperialism, but more complexly as proponents of one of several expressions of nationalist thought and partisan mobilization at the end of the Spanish period. In this essay I examine two of these groups of men, one each from Cuba and Puerto Rico. Occupying the right wing of the independence movement in both cases, the Cuban and Puerto Rican imperialist nationalists operated within vastly different political contexts.

The results of their work were fittingly diverse. Because of the momentum towards national independence already achieved by Cuban fighters, right-wing nationalists collaborated with the U.S. in fashioning a neo-colonial status. They helped neutralize the more radical elements of the independence forces, particularly in the rebel army. They lubricated the transition to a sovereign but not wholly independent state, a state nominally free of colonial domination but nonetheless subordinate to the U.S. empire. Its neo-colonial status differed substantially from the political integration many of them had hoped to achieve once Cuba became libre. In nearby Puerto Rico, however, the island's speedy conversion into a colonial sphere under a vague territorial status created conditions for the imperialist nationalists' transformation into advocates of statehood and partisans of the Americanization effort. In this essay I suggest that the divergent trajectories of imperialist nationalists in Cuba and Puerto Rico help us identify key elements of the transition from the Spanish to the U.S. empires in the Caribbean, characteristics of the transitional context that are otherwise not easily grasped.

Mauricio Tenorio (Chicago)-- **Abstract [Msg. 1/29/10]**

Making sense of promiscuity: Empire, race, and mestizaje.

Empire and race produced consequences that have been vastly studied: slavery, orientalisms, racism, colonialism, and, of course, miscegenation. I want to focus on the latter. For miscegenation, violent mixtures, rapes, blending, syncretism, *mestizaje*, *melcocha* ... all these have been historical facts whether

we talk about sex, culture, science or religion. Reduced to its very basics, mestizaje could be history's only indisputable law: *ceteris paribus*, everybody sleeps with everybody. What one society or country does with the *acostón*, varies in time and space, but not the very occurrence of *mestizaje*. Many early modern and modern weighty concepts –Christian, subject, just war, citizens, Empire, identity, equality, race or nation—somehow had something to do with making sense of promiscuity. Making sense of this historical fact, promiscuity, has left telling traces in history, traces which not only reflect what the late Edward Said called a “culture of Empire,” but also, as it were, local racial, not necessarily anti-racist, anti-Imperial cultures.

Within, for instance, the race-obsessed U.S. historiography, until very recently, miscegenation has been a taboo; the norm has been the use of race as a way to fix people in well-delimited and separated colors, changing moral polarities as time goes by. That has been the American way of making sense of promiscuity. In turn, at first glance, mestizaje seems to be post-revolutionary Mexico's successful and more or less official –that is sanctioned by state and intellectual institutions— way of making sense of promiscuity. In fact, if the global context of possibilities for making sense of promiscuity are considered, sanctioning the mestizo/mestizaje comes out as the Mexican common way of dealing with all sorts of promiscuities --since the incorporation of “mestizo” into the Spanish legal, social, and moral prose in the 1530s. But then again always within the global circulation of ideas, fears, social experiments, and peoples. Otherwise it would be like being surprised by good old father Las Casas for not uttering a single word on behalf of gay Indigenous people.

I want to examine a historical category (mestizo/mestizaje) in the crossfire of two lasting historical tracks: on one hand, making sense of promiscuity; on the other, the durable powers of what I call the global search of the brown Atlantis – the global creation of the idea of Mexico, mostly by foreigners but also by Mexicans between *circa* 1870 and 1940. Brown Atlantis connoted a racial obsession—brown—and a place—Atlantis—whose essential reality was not topographic but moral, made precisely by the fact of being simultaneously a robust presupposition (that Atlantis existed) and a relentless search (it had to be found). By 1920 the Atlantis was a modernist imagined place that presumed its own existence, but at the same time had been sought time and time again for centuries. Therefore it was a cultural undertaking necessarily linked to at least three modern issues that made the Atlantis both a noun and a verb: namely, evasion (to evade), authenticity (to authenticate), and discovery (to discover). To be sure there were, and are, various forms of evasion, authenticity, and discovering, depending on who, how, and when defined or defines Mexico. But what I consider a relatively constant is the very need of evasion, authenticity, and discovery in defining such a thing as Mexico. Of course, the specific contents of this very modernist category cannot be extrapolate to the 17th or the 18th centuries, but, I submit, its essential logic of a search can.

The papers thus tells the story of this crossfire in which the mestizo emerged both as the hero and as the villain, but always as the protagonist, three century ago or today. Specifically, the paper reviews two telling moments: the

construction of mestizaje as purgatory in the Spanish empire (New Spain, circa 1530-1770), and the nationalizing of that purgatory between 1870 and 1940 in Mexico. By making sense of promiscuity—understood as a historically specific local phenomenon—mestizaje acquired, as it were, its positive charge. The durable search of the Brown Atlantis—undertook mostly but not solely by foreigners—granted mestizaje its strong negative charge. Like an electrical reel, in the crossfire of these two polarities, of these two historical tracks, mestizo/mestizaje gained its historical dynamism and strength within Mexican history and beyond. Thus throughout the 20th century Mexican mestizaje completed an entire circle: from a new imperial program—supported by the U.S. and international agencies in the Americas—to once again a *bête noir* for the new global creed of multiculturalism.

Gary Wilder (CUNY))--**Abstract [Msg. 1/28/10]**

Decolonizing France: L.S. Senghor's African Socialism Revisited

In the decade following World War II, Léopold Sédar Senghor developed an original program for African Socialism as a medium for decolonization. A set of Cold War assumptions has often led critics to treat Senghor's socialism as a superficial, cynical, or opportunistic state ideology. Such evaluations are conditioned by a tendency to read his postwar interventions anachronistically from the perspective of his postcolonial presidency. They also proceed from a historically specific logic of decolonization which presumed that self-determination had to assume a territorial national form. This paper will challenge these assumptions by examining Senghor's interventions as founder of independent socialist political parties and his theoretical reflections on Marxism and socialism between 1948 and 1960. His African Socialism sought to articulate Marx's dialectical method and ethical project of human emancipation with African religiosity, ethics, and aesthetics. I will argue that his African socialism functioned as a form of political theology through which colonized Africans, led by party cadres, could not only end colonialism, but also revitalize Marxism, redeem socialism, and save Europe itself, which had been alienated by an instrumental rationality that reduces the human person to material utility, confuses standard of living with reason for living, and perversely inverts human means and ends.

I will pay special attention to the integrated character of this programmatic vision which insisted on the indissociable links among socialism, politics, ethics, and religion; socialism, federalism, and decolonization; processes of juridicopolitical and socioeconomic restructuring; and transformations in colonial and metropolitan societies. Senghor's redemptive vision of African socialism insisted that real decolonization could not be restricted to West Africa, but had to include continental France as well. For Senghor, the end of empire, self-determination for Africans, socialist restructuring in France, and the joining of overseas Africa and metropolitan France within a single democratic federation all depended on one another. This paper will thus propose an alternative interpretation of Senghor as socialist actor and political thinker in order to challenge inherited assumptions about decolonization that reduce colonial

emancipation to national liberation. Senghorian decolonization may thus illuminate our current postnational constellation.