

Truman Doctrine, cont'd

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By the summer of 1949, as the Greek Civil War came to its very tragic close, American policymakers had just about worked out a strategy of containment and counter-revolution. Because, you see, they had learned in Greece how to deploy military supply, how to deploy economic aid and technical assistance in order, fundamentally, to close off the option of revolution in Greece and to turn the tide of the war. What I'm saying is that, for American policymakers, Greece was what Vietnam would be a generation later — that, essentially, it was a great laboratory of learning how you do things that had to be done. But Greece was something more than just a laboratory for American policymakers. It also would become, from the end of that civil war down to the present time, a showcase — a kind of model of political stabilization and of economic growth. Because those American policymakers also learn how to manipulate economic and military power in order, if you please, to keep Greece within what was called the "free world." And in order to insert what was a very, very bare economy into an American-led world order.

And what we are concerned with, after all, is what that world order meant not only to the Greek people but to tens of millions of others who, ultimately, were to live under it; what Truman Doctrine democracy meant for those to whom its benefits, presumably, were to be carried. What we want to know, after all, is what the impact of this strategy of containment and counter-revolution is in a country like Greece. We want to ask the question, if you please, of what it meant to the Greek people that their political process became a function of counter-revolution. We want to ask what it meant to the Greek people that their economic growth was programmed by private American interests and by that very narrow Greek elite which was in collaboration with those interests. And we want to ask something very fundamental: of what would happen if, after all, that economic growth in Greece, as distorted as it was, were to create internal contradictions in the society, as in fact it did in the middle of the 1960s. And forces emerged which made their demands and expressed aspirations that began to threaten the hegemony of the United States. And, if that happened, what would be the reaction, then, of America creating, presumably, free choices inside Greece, imposing its Truman Doctrine democracy?

And, if you look over the history of those Greek people over the past twenty-five years, from the period from the end of the civil war down to the very present, there is one thing that is overwhelming and compelling about the history of that society. And that is that it is ruled,

persistently over that twenty-five-year period, with the exception of one brief interlude in 1964 and 1965 — for a year and a half — but for the rest of the time it is ruled from the extreme right. What we're talking about is that Greek politics do become a function of counter-revolution. And, in fact, that should not greatly surprise us. It shouldn't surprise us, in the first place, because the very cadre of the left had been decimated in the resistance and in the civil war; that men and women, literally by the hundreds of thousands, who had been either of the left or sufficiently progressive that they wanted some kind of a refurbishing of Greek democracy — some kind of a new start in Greek society — that, by the hundreds of thousands, they either were killed or exiled in the course of that resistance movement and, especially, of the civil war.

It should not surprise us, in the second place, because of the very clever use that right-wing governments made of anti-Communist propaganda in the period from the end of the civil war on. The civil war, after all, had been, ultimately, terroristic on both sides; that the Communist and the pro-Communist forces, in desperation, had, in fact, committed acts of atrocity. And the governments deployed that kind of propaganda very effectively to do something important, namely to destroy that very broad coalition of popular forces that had been at the root of the resistance movement — in other words, to part and to make a division between large numbers of peasants and of petty bourgeois from the effective force of the Left. And, consequently, immobilize that sector of Greek population, push it off into a dead center of apathy so that the right could rule without very much opposition. And those peasants and that petty bourgeoisie would not effectively raise their voices or come back into Greek politics until the Papandreou Movement of 1964 and '65 when suddenly they constitute, again, the backlog, as we will see, of some kind of a mass movement.

Nor should it surprise us, in the third place, because of what really is primordial. And that is the American presence; that Greece, after all, becomes, within the framework of Truman Doctrine strategy, an American satrapy, that fundamentally, it is the American embassy, in Athens, that really calls the turn in Greek politics. It is the era of Loy Henderson, the era of Henry Grady, the era of John Peurifoy, of those American ambassadors who intervened actively and directly into the affairs of Greece. And, when the Americans intervene, it is always to safeguard a very real anti-Communist regime; one that will, in no way, permit opposition to the strategy that America is charting for Greece, that will in no way interfere with what the American purposes are.

And you see what that means. It means that the United States gave its ultimate support, over that eight-year period of the rule of the so-called Radical Union Party, between 1955 and 1963, to Konstantinos Karamanlis who was the reactionary ruler, Prime Minister of Greece; gave him its full support. And then in 1965: supported King Konstantinos, when he dismissed Papandreou because that Center Union movement had begun to become progressive and, indeed, a mass

movement. And it is that American support for the military coup of April the 21st of 1967, which, after all, gives it its head, and gives it its possibility and cadre.

You see, that in American policymakers' minds there was at times the idea that a reformist regime, a kind of liberal regime, might be effectively co-optative. That's what all the bright policymakers around John Kennedy kept thinking, the [economist John Kenneth] Galbraiths and the [diplomat George] Ballses and the like. That, after all, it was better to have somewhat enlightened regimes doing the American interest than these kind of reactionary, Neanderthal regimes that had been supported in the age of [Secretary of State John] Foster Dulles. But don't be overwhelmed by that; that, ultimately, those programs of Alliance for Progress and so forth were always meant to be co-optative.

But more than that, American policymakers very quickly scrapped them, and they scrapped them whenever they seemed to get out of hand, whenever the very reforms themselves seem to become dangerous. And I remember full well being in Japan at the time of the so-called "Reischauer offensive," when Eddie Reischauer was our ambassador in Japan, and he a much more enlightened guy than Ambassador MacArthur — that was Arthur MacArthur, the nephew of General MacArthur — who really had a kind of a mailed fist and ruled with a hammer and a club. And Eddie Reischauer came as a good Harvard liberal to rule with a silken glove, and consequently to try to seduce the right wing of the Socialist Party in Japan, or the right wing of the trade union movement. But then, you see, all of that didn't work. And I was down in Doshisha University in the south of Japan — I had to be there to make a speech at the opening of what was to be called Amherst House, why they asked me I don't know — but it suffices to say that I was at Doshisha, and Eddie Reischauer came to speak on the same program. And I got there and I spoke, and he couldn't get out of his car because the Zengakuren, the student movement, surrounded the car and began to shake it shouting, "We don't want the Reischauer offensive." Well, you see, it wasn't working [*laughter*].

And, consequently, much more reliable, always is, the regime directly of the right. And so you have that very interesting and very blunt commentary made by the political officer of the American embassy in Paraguay in 1971, when he was asked why the Americans, after all, supported the Stroessner dictatorship — which one of the brutal dictatorships in South America, which kept 90% of the people illiterate, which kept them landless — and the answer that the political officer of the embassy gave was this: "In the final analysis, our policy is one of survival. Thus a sure anti-Communist, no matter how despicable he may be, is better than a reformer, no matter how honest, who might turn against us." And, consequently, in Greece, there was no question where the American force lay: it lay behind, very decisively and decidedly, right-wing governments.

And, consequently, it should not surprise us that over that twenty-five-year period, except for one brief interval, Greece is ruled from that side. But it raises a number of questions. When we say that Greece is ruled from the right, it raises the question of what the strategy of that right is, of what the instruments of that counter-revolution are, and who the beneficiaries are; which is crucially important, and tells you a great deal about the impact of this kind of strategy upon Third World peoples, or peoples living in a society as underdeveloped as Greece. And when you ask what the strategy is? The strategy, bluntly, is anti-communism. Or to put it, perhaps, in more institutional terms: it is the establishment of a sufficient police apparatus inside the society so that there is no viable opposition to the strategy approved by American policymakers, by the monarchy in Greece, and by the Greek elite. In other words: to contain what might be, really, an opposition movement. And that anti-communism took varied forms in Greece, and it's almost a model.

It took, quite obviously, the form of outlawing communism *per se*, so that the Communist Party of Greece was officially outlawed by the Law of 27th of December of 1947, in the midst of the civil war. And, with that outlawing of the Communist Party, EAM, the resistance party, was also outlawed. And included were all things called "Communist front organizations." Now, the Communists, then, officially disappear. And the party itself went into exile and remained in exile. But those Communists who remained inside Greece and who were able to form anything at all, formed a party in 1951 called EDA, E-D-A, or the United Democratic Left. And EDA was a kind of social-democratic coalition between Communists and socialists and certain progressive liberals. And, consequently, never was a socialist party; was, basically, a party for progressive reforms inside the cadre of the existing Greek society, and it had a certain strength in the 1950s. At the 1958 elections EDA received 27% of the vote, elected 79 deputies. But after that, you see, it gets very heavily repressed, and the government comes down very strongly on what it considers to be now simply a Communist front party and begins to repress it very harshly. So that you get communism *per se* as an entity that you can define — quite obviously, suppressed.

But that, you see, isn't the point. That's not the point of anti-communism. The point of anti-communism in the United States or any place else is really to strike at dissent, is really circumscribe the right to mount any kind of opposition movement to what the ongoing programs or what the ongoing strategy happens to be. And in that, the Greek government was rich in a kind of ingenuity. So that it used administrative fiat, for example, so that the Ministry of Internal Security in Greece could simply take police reports and, on the basis of police reports, could deport anyone considered to be a subversive to one of the Greek islands to be placed in a prison or in a concentration camp.

But it's more than that. It's that old principle that the French call the *livret*; in other words, the

passbook. What is called the "passbook," really, in South Africa: it is the certification of good citizenship. By a law of January 30, 1948, in order to hold public employment or semi-public employment in Greece, it was necessary to have what is called a "certificate of good conduct or good citizenship." Basically, meant that you were not a Communist or what was called a crypto-Communist, in other words, a sympathizer. But what is most interesting about that is that gets extended beyond public or semi-public employment to all employment, so that if you want a job as a tobacco worker, or you want a job on a building site, or if you want any kind of menial labor job, you must have such certification.

And, you see, that puts tremendous power into the hands of the police. And I want you to note this well because I'm going to deal with this theme, at a later point, separately. It is my contention that one of the fundamental, morphological changes that have come about in contemporary societies is basically the extent and the autonomous, independent power of policing, of policing populations. And, surely, you get it in a country like Greece in an extremely sophisticated form. So that, by 1963, the police had dossiers on a million and a half people in a society that didn't even have a population of 10 million. Well, you see what that means. That means that if you get out of line, if you demonstrate, if you express dissident opinions, you may be excluded from a job. And what it does is to provide a fantastic form of social control. And, you see, if you understand something about the paranoia of police, if you understand that they see subversion everywhere, if you understand that they are trained and picked in order to find subversion even where it doesn't exist, then you understand what [French intellectual] André Glucksmann means, and with which I whole heartily agree, that in contemporary societies fascism may not take the form, after all, that it has taken in classic and historic ways — with mass movements centered around irrational population — but it may be what Glucksmann the occupation of the government by the Ministry of the Interior. In other words, in which an autonomous police is able to control populations by its *vichear*: by the kind of dossiers it has on people, by its files, by its surveillance and the like.

And you know, parenthetically, I live so much of the time and so much of my life in France, and where I have seen [Raymond] Marcellin, who is the Minister of the Interior in France, and who is a paranoid of the first order, and who sees subversion everywhere, and has built up dossiers — the French keep dossiers anyway about everything. And they pile up, no matter what you do, you have a big dossier; and if you live there a period of time, and you still have blood in your veins, you're sure really to be in their bad graces. And under Marcellin it has just become fantastic, and so I was really quite shocked the last year when I was there, because a man named Denis Langlois, who is a good civil liberties lawyer, published a book in France called *Les Dossiers noirs de la police française* (*The Black Book of the French Police*), in which he cited a number of documents that had been slipped to him from the Ministry of the Interior, to show what kind

of surveillance was being done. And I was reading this book, and there was this long document about the fact that Paris had become a center of world revolution, and there were all these foreigners who were around in the damn city, and they were centering themselves there in order to build up revolutionary movements in their own countries. And it listed 75 countries that had revolutionary movements centered in Paris, and finally it got down to the United States, and the only two people that were named there was one Maria Jolas. Maria Jolas is a great friend of mine, she's 82 years old [*laughter*]. She's a great authority on James Joyce, she's lived there fifty years, she's editing Joyce's correspondence, but she happens to have spoken out on a few issues. The other one was me [*laughter*]. Now, it struck me as being very, very strange — yes, it's very flattering in a certain way — but I thought, really, the world revolutionary movement was in terrible shape if this 82-year-old woman and this broken-down professor [*laughter*] are at the center, really, of this kind of subversion.

And so, finally, I thought I ought get to the bottom of this thing. So I went to get my *carte de séjour* renewed, and I was having more and more trouble getting the thing renewed, and they were just harassing, and so you wait five weeks or six weeks and so forth to get your resident card renewed. And the last time I had to go up to the fifth floor, that's the political police, to see Monsieur Balayouse — who by now is an old friend of mine I've seen him so often — and I went up there, and I said, "This is ridiculous." And I had the book with me, and I said, "Marcellin is going off his head, I mean, quite obviously this is just sheer paranoia," and this kind of thing. And he said, "Well, I don't know," and he said, "Let me call for your dossier." Well, the dossier gets bigger and bigger, and you live and it gets bigger, obviously [*laughter*]. You say something here, there or the other place. And he looks in the dossier and he says, "Ah... you're not really too clever, are you?" And I said, "Well, what do you mean? Is the embassy getting angry because I've been talking about Vietnam?" And he said, "Oh yes, that's it" [*laughter*]. But I said, "But that's very recent, that's very recent, that can't irritate Marcellin, it must be Algeria." Well, of course it was, that was the sensitive thing in the thing. Now, the problem was, and he handed me then this sheet that I had to sign, which said that I wouldn't engage in political activity on the threat of being expelled within twelve hours. Well, I didn't want to be expelled in twelve hours, it was just *pro forma*, you know. Well, they had no right, you see, I'm an American! And consequently, I have all this power behind me [*laughter*].

And so you can imagine how it is if you're Portuguese, if you're Spanish, or if you're just a French worker, for example, and you have no resources at all at your disposal. Well, put it all in the context of Greece and understand what it means, for example, to talk about good citizenship in those terms and you see how difficult it is, then, to mount anything contrary to this particular right. Now, the consequence of that is most conspicuous in terms of the weakening of the trade union movement in Greece; that trade union movement — weak anyway from the point of view

that you have, really, a small number of workers, you have not had an industrial program that has enabled you to build up a sizeable proletariat — but weak because of the constant surveillance, because the government did install a reactionary leadership in 1946, when [prime minister Konstantinos] Tsaldaris simply ousted the Communist leadership of the Greek Confederation of Labor. Weak, because every member union in the General Confederation of Labor in Greece had to promise to fight communism; weak because the regime put surveillance over all kinds of labor activity, there is a special section of the Greek police dedicated to nothing but that overseership labor.

Now, you see what the importance of that is. If there is to be investment in Greece, if it is to be profitable, it is because there is a docile and cheap labor force. And that is guaranteed, after all, by the kind of manipulation of this principle of anti-communism built into this police structure of the regime in Greece. And there is a corollary to that. A corollary that is really very sad. If we say anti-communism as a positive strategy what we mean, as a corollary, is the purging, from the Greek consciousness, and from Greek life, and from Greek history, of the resistance. It is fantastic. Greece is the only country in Europe where the people mounted a war against the German occupation where they have taken no pride in it, where it has not been celebrated at the national level.

In every other country, where there was a resistance movement, people after the resistance fought for the prestige of saying they were *résistants*. Somebody in Amsterdam told me that there are more people in that city who claimed to have been in the Dutch resistance than live in that city because that became a prestige item. Not so in Greece. Not mentioned in the schools. The victims of the occupation, the maimed: not given pensions, no monuments to the fighters in the resistance. And finally, not even a celebration, until October of 1964, of the liberation of Athens twenty years earlier. All of that to be forgotten because, you see, the resistance was a mass movement and that the regime had to eliminate as any kind of an example or any kind of a model. And so, we talk about strategy, and, then, we ask the questions the tenets of power. We ask what the instruments of this right wing were.

The instruments, quite obviously, the right-wing party, in the first instance, within the constitutional structure. And the right-wing party that dominated much of this period, after the civil war, was a party called the ERE, or the Radical Union Party. The Radical Union Party was in office continuously under Karamanlis between 1955 and 1963. And which was, really, an offshoot of the old reactionary, monarchist party called the Populist Party. Now, why the right-wing parties should have won persistently, again, should be no great surprise. It shouldn't be a great surprise from three points of view. First of all, that the bureaucracy, and note it well, the police and the bureaucracy, in Greece, were never purged. It's the one country that did not have

the left in office, ever, in order to make a post-occupation purge; that the collaborationists, the pro-Nazis, the pro-Metaxas people, who have been in the Greek bureaucracy and police, remain there, all of which means that you have an apparatus of coercion in order to guarantee tricked elections or controlled elections.

In the second place, you have, really, a very weak opposition. And this goes back to our original analysis of Greek history; that the opposition is the so-called liberal opposition, was an offshoot of the Venizelos movement [named for Eleftherios Venizelos, Greek prime minister during World War I]. And those liberals, first of all, until 1961 — until they organized what was called the center union party-under old Georgios Papandreou — until '61, the liberals were divided. They were fissured into little groups, each following its own particular leader. But something more than that, and that is that Greek liberalism never really offered an alternative *Weltanschauung*; it never had an alternative strategy for Greece, not, certainly, until the mid-1960s. It was the outs rather than the ins: they were politicians with their clientele, and they wanted a place in the Greek government. But they did the bidding of the British, and they did the bidding of the Americans. And there really was nothing in that centrist movement — that liberal movement — that had anything like a program to offer the Greek people around which anybody could rally.

But there's something else, and note it well: and that is that the center, or the liberals, no matter how much they did the British and the American bidding, found that the Americans didn't like them. And I discovered in Athens, when I went to see the political officer, a Mr. Miller, and I said to Mr. Miller, "You know that the liberals say that you are terrible here" — this was during the Karamanlis period — "because you never invite them to the embassy. They can't even get inside." And: "Well, why should we invite them, because this Radical Union is safe. It's in power, it's going to remain there forever" — this was about six months before Karamanlis fell, incidentally, which shows you what kind of an astute diplomacy we have. But it suffices to say, he said, "They're going to be there forever. We don't have to see these liberals who really are a kind of unsure bunch anyway." The point is that American diplomacy really ousted these liberals from any kind of consideration, and certainly hated them in the period of the 1960s.

And there's a marvelous illustration of that which tells you a great deal about how Greek politics worked in that period of Truman Doctrine democracy. The American policymakers were a bit upset, our policymakers in Greece, the instability of the Greek government between 1947 and 1952; that is that the Greek right really was too divided or fissured into several parties. And these elections and there would be all kinds of coalition governments and they really weren't very safe or stable. Now, between '47 and '52, the United States poured \$2.5 billion worth of aid into Greece. And dammit we wanted something! We wanted mileage out of that kind of aid. And

what we wanted was a strong, solid, stable conservative government in that country.

Now, that we were promised in 1952, when a general, General [Alexandros] Papagos, organized the right in Greece into a single party called the Greek Rally. And the ambassador in Athens from the United States, John Peurifoy, he loved that particular party. And he thought, finally, this has resolved the problem. At that point, the centrists, the liberals, said that in the elections of 1952, there must be proportional representation. And they fought and made a big campaign for proportional representation which meant that they might be able to undercut, even with a variety of parties, they might be able to undercut this so-called Greek Rally of General Papagos. And at that point, in a very famous episode, Ambassador Peurifoy, on the 14th of June of 1952, intervened directly and said publicly in Athens: "Proportional representation will only mean government instability in Greece that will undermine the effectiveness of American aid which may then be curtailed." Well, there was no proportional representation. Obviously, it was the mailed fist; the ambassador was saying, "Either you permit this right-wing party to win this election clear and even, or we will simply cut off aid." And Peurifoy threatened that. There was a certain stir over his intervention, but he had the clout to do it.

And I want to point out to you, parenthetically, that, you see, John Peurifoy — and you should remember a name like John Peurifoy, because he really is one of the great John Waynes of American diplomacy — and Peurifoy, you see, was just cutting his teeth here in Greece. Because the next year, in the middle of 1953, we find him off, do we not, in Guatemala. And that was too bad for Señor Árbenz, who happened to be the head of the Guatemalan government and was something of a reformer. Well, [President Jacobo] Árbenz had been in power in Guatemala for three years. He had banned the Communist Party. He really wasn't much of a subversive, not terribly dangerous. But he had, in Guatemala, you see, all of these poverty-stricken peasants, these poor Indians. And, consequently, he looked around and he saw all of this land in the hands of the United Fruit Company. And he said, "Obviously, we won't take the banana land, but there's lots of land United Fruit has that is simply unoccupied." And so, he said, "The Guatemalan government will take back 225,000 acres of land that are not being used. But we will pay for them." Well, the paying for them is what created the difficulty. Because what Árbenz said is, "We will pay exactly the assessment value that United Fruit has claimed for tax purposes" [*laughter*]. Well, quite obviously, they were furious. The State Department said that was insane, and consequently that it could not be. Well, then Peurifoy got there. And this is Peurifoy writing back to the State Department at the end of 1953 about poor Árbenz, and he says this, and it really is a magnificent comment: "Árbenz thinks like a Communist, talks like a Communist and — if not actually a Communist — he will do until a real one comes along" [*laughter*]. And finally, in June of 1954, with American guns and American planes cover the coup that overthrows this reformist regime in Guatemala and installs a very reactionary one.

Which shows you, really, what Peurifoy was making a trial run on when he was insisting that the Papagos government come into power in Greece in 1952. Parenthetically, you just really cannot even extend your imagination far enough to know what money can do and what power can do. And I tell you this little story about Guatemala. Well, out in Paris, in the Guatemalan embassy, for a number of years, was a very distinguished writer as the ambassador, a man named Miguel Asturias, who won the Nobel Prize. And because Asturias was involved with the Russell Tribunal and the anti-Vietnam War movement and so forth, I got to know him. And I used to go to the Guatemalan embassy in Paris and he said to him one day — I thought that this was one of those fictive things that was a fiction of his imagination — he said, "You know, I am the first Guatemalan ambassador to Paris in twenty-five years who is not in the pay of the American government." I said "Oh, well, you know, I could imagine that for the Guatemalan ambassador in Washington. But the one in Paris? You mean that in a figurative way, that it is sold to the Americans in a figurative way." "No, no. I mean the literal way." And then he showed me the documentation that there actually was payment to these particular Guatemalan diplomatic personnel. Why? Because the Guatemalans had only one important embassy in Europe and that was in Paris. And, consequently, when they sent students over, a few elite students, to study, they simply wanted a proper overseeing of these students to make sure that they weren't imbibing radical ideas with which they would then undermine Guatemalan administration.

And so, you see, what kind of an extent, what kind of strange, strange tentacles the whole policy of containment ultimately begins then to have; so that you get, quite obviously, this kind of American commitment. The right-wing party began with the Greek Rally of Papagos in 1952, which clearly won the elections of '52, got 247 seats out of 300, and did, really, things that American policymakers liked, because the Minister of Coordination — by which we mean the minister of planning, of economic planning in Greece — was Spyros Markezinis. And Markezinis became, really, a kind of mouthpiece for American investment because Markezinis, who became the strong man in the Papagos government, provided a policy that really invited in American capital.

What he decided, in the first place, was to remove all legal obstacles to foreign imports into Greece. And secondly, he pushed through that famous law of the 31st of October of 1953, Law 2687 which is the Law on Foreign Investment. And the Law on Foreign Investment, after all, provides for the absolute guarantee of foreign investment — that it cannot be nationalized, that it is safe at all times — and secondly, provided tremendous tax relief for all of those who were developing the Greek economy by this kind of foreign investment. Papagos himself ingratiated himself to the Americans by the military agreement of the 12th of October of 1953. Because, by that agreement, the United States got the right to build military bases and maintain them inside Greece, to use Greek roads and railroads for the passage of troops, and also, which was

extraordinary for 1953, to get the right to quarter American troops in Greece with extraterritorial privileges. In other words, not subject, as residents in Greece, actually to Greek law.

Now, all of that was very neat. But, you see, sometimes nature takes its course and disrupts a program. And it's disrupted often, as it was on the 5th of October of 1955, by nature. General Papagos died. And when Papagos died, quite obviously, there was a sudden kind of vacuum, and the King intervened. And the King was King Paul of Greece. And King Paul intervened, and he said, "Alright, I will choose to replace Papagos the Minister of Public Works," who at that time was a kind of second-rate figure, and whose name was Konstantinos Karamanlis. And Karamanlis was relatively unknown. He didn't come from one of the great elite families. But he became, over the next eight years, really the strong man of the Greek right, and very much an instrument for maintaining Greece within the entire vision of what American policymakers were concerned about.

And Karamanlis was chosen for two reasons. He was chosen, first of all, because of this fantastic loyalty that he had for the king. And the king was concerned about that; the kings had not been loved in the 20th century in Greece. And having great loyalty was really a desideratum. And that meant, for Karamanlis, something very important because, if the king loved him and if he was loyal to the king, it meant that his regime always had the support of the army — always had the support of the general corps in the army, especially, which was very monarchist and very devoted to the royal house. And the significance of that should not escape you. Because you must understand that in Greece, during all of this period, the army administers a rather wide zone. It administers, after all, what's called the Zone of Surveillance, which is all along that 1,200-kilometer northern frontier. And it's a zone that contains, in 1961, about a million people in a population of about 8.25 million at that particular time. So that, in those zones, the army, you see, could ensure very substantial electoral victories for the government in power, for this right-wing government. Consider that, in the 1961 elections, the ERE, the Radical Union, on the overall got 51% of the vote in Greece, but in that Zone of Occupation of the military, it got 94% of the vote. Well, the differential shouldn't escape you. It, obviously, simply is army coercion. All of which was good for the Karamanlis regime.

The other thing was that the Americans liked him. They had gotten to know Karamanlis when he was Minister of Public Works. He had been very, very cooperative in building the infrastructure that the American army people wanted. And, in addition to that, he was sufficiently fanatical on the Communist question. Or as Foster Dulles said, "He believes in Western values." And by "Western values," after all, was meant that he was willing to undertake the crusade and to open the Greek market very favorably to American investors.

And so Karamanlis came in with that kind of support, and really lasted for eight years. The regime was awful. I was in Greece a great deal in the Karamanlis period between '55 and '63, and it really was a police state. That is to say that the operation or the apparatus of the police really was ubiquitous; the so-called security police, which really were Praetorian Guards for the Radical Union Party, but more than that what was called the National Security Battalions. These were army battalions at the village level, run by military officers, really, to have surveillance over the villages. And then, finally, the Greek Intelligence Service. The Greek Intelligence Service, which was really organized by the CIA, which worked in very close cooperation with it and which, quite obviously, was ferreting out subversion wherever it could.

But, you see, all of that is constitutional. You have a right-wing party, it's out in front. The crucial thing about Greek politics in this period is the existence of extra-constitutional forces that can and do intervene when the moment is right and when the moment seems propitious. One of those forces, quite obviously: the monarchy. Now, the Greek monarchy, not loved in the 20th century. A little bit uptight about its lack of popularity. There had been a republic for a ten-year period between 1924 and 1935, and the king, George II, would never have come back to Greece if the resistance had been able to beat the British. And, consequently, the royal house, Paul and his queen Frederica, supported any group or any party that was utterly devoted to the monarchy. But it's something more than that. It is that the monarchy had no *raison d'être*. It had no reason to exist in Greece except insofar as it did the work of a Greek elite. It did the work of the great bankers and the great shippers: the Onassis, the Niarchos, and so forth in Greece.

Now, they want to tell you something about that because, when I say to do the work of that elite, I'm talking about a kind of Greek capitalism that is unlike anything you recognize in Western Europe. Let us say in Western Europe, in Great Britain or in France, the capitalist class comes ultimately to understand that it could work with social democratic parties. Socialists come to power, Willy Brandt comes to power in Germany: it's no great catastrophe. Harold Wilson comes to power in England: the London *Economist* says, "He's the best Conservative prime minister we could have." And consequently, there's really no great threat. And when in France, for example, Guy Mollet is the prime minister in 1956, he's the one that really escalates the war against the Algerian liberation movement. And so there is a sophistication. Not in Greece: the civil war had burned those Greece capitalists. They really had been burned by what they considered a terrible and a permanent threat. And instead of the civil war making them more tractable, it made them more intransigent. And the one force that they felt always stood for an absolutely unchanging society — one in which productive relationships would never be altered or modified — was the monarchy. And so, the monarchy intervened not against communism but against any threat of reformism. That's why King Konstantinos intervened in July of 1965 to oust Papandreou and the Center Union Party at a time when it had introduced a very mild reform

program.

And the second extra-constitutional force, the creation of your government, the Greek Army. By 1967, when there are less than 10 million people in Greece, the Greek Army numbers 160,000 armed men, it numbers 37,000 reserves, it has a division of Patton M47 tanks, it has ground-to-ground missiles, it has 10,000 officers. And I want you to think about that. And I want you to understand that that is created, quite obviously, by the military aid program that the United States sends to Greece. It is created by the arms that the Pentagon sells to the Greek government. It is created, after all, to make capability out of NATO. And in order to sell American weapons. But I want you to ask the question in your own minds. What it means when American policy really arms the armies of the Third World to such a point that the differential of power between those armies and the people that manipulate them, and the rest of society is so vast that there is no way of coping with it. What are the implications of that? Ask any Chilean.

And consequently, it is that way armed. Ideologically — well, if you can talk about an ideology on the part of the Greek officer corps — look, that in the twentieth century, you can count twenty rebellions that are mounted inside the Greek officer corps. And you can count thirty secret societies organized by factions of officers; that down until 1935, these rebellions and secret societies were sometimes progressive, sometimes Nasserite (in other words, modernists), were really wanting a new opening in Greek society. Then you get under Metaxas, really, the purge of the Greek Army. And after the civil war, really a fundamental purge, so that all officers who fought against the Germans in the occupation are ousted. And the ones that are in command are the ones that have fought against the Communists in the civil war. It is Papagos who put at the very top levels the people who organized the concentration camps for the Communists in the course of the Greek Civil War. And so, when you talk about ideology, you're talking about blind devotion to the monarchy, talking about great devotion to the United States which is the source of their largess, you are talking about fanatical, fanatical anti-communism. These Greek generals fancied themselves to be Sovietologues — in other words, a kind of expert group on the Soviet Union. And you read, then, in the army manuals and so forth all kinds of those fantastic tales about the potentiality of a Soviet descent, immediately, upon Greece and upon the danger to its national security. So, that the army stands ready to intervene when there is a threat.

And the final extra-constitutional force: the United States. And American policymakers were swarming across Greece. And you have to understand something about a country like that; I've been in a lot of countries like that, where there are American advisors at every level in the economic administration. In the Ministry of Coordination, for example, there are American technical advisors to suggest what kind of infrastructure there should be. To the army, quite obviously, American officers to design how the strategy should go, how the weapons should be

used. In the intelligence services themselves, the CIA, quite obviously giving its expertise to the Greek intelligence services; all of which means that they have, not only the right, but the extra-constitutional right. Neat! And that was Truman Doctrine democracy.

And the beneficiaries of that kind of regime: oh, well, the Greek elite. No sense talking about Onassis and Niarchoses; no sense talking about the fact that, in 1967, for example, of all of the budget of Greece, only 16% came from direct taxes; no sense talking about the fact that there are all kinds of subsidies to these elitists. But what we're interested in are the American investments. And they come into Greece, not in vast quantity, but enough to show that it had become a market. And between 1954 and 1964, in that ten-year period, after the 1953 law was passed, there were 341 contracts awarded, under that law, of which 50% were American contracts. It meant that Dow Chemical was in Greece; it meant that Chrysler was in Greece; it meant that Reynolds Metal was there.

But two are most interesting: comes the contract of November of 1962, which is the contract called Esso-Pappas. And Esso-Pappas is, of course, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Thomas Pappas of Boston, of Greek descent, an entrepreneur. And that contract was fantastic. It was for an economic development of \$119 million around the city of Salonika in Macedonia, and it gave virtually a monopoly on oil refining to this particular group. And it gave the potentiality, then, for building, then, a steel works and a petrochemical works. Which meant that Salonika as a major center, and southern Macedonia would really be developed by this particular group. But even more fantastic — and you have to see, really, what the frontier is — even more fantastic was a contract of early 1966. Early 1966, that's after Papandreou has been ousted — when Stefanos Stefanopoulos has come in as the prime minister, when all of Greek politics is good and conservative again — and there is a contract granted to Litton Industries. Now, Litton Industries is a conglomerate of rather bad repute, and it went into Greece because that was an economy of terrible repute [*laughter*]. And consequently, it could do what it wanted.

And the contract that Litton Industry signed in 1966 really is prototypical of what we mean by a neo-colonial situation. Because two entire Greek districts, the island of Crete to begin with and the Western Peloponnese, were given over to Litton Industries to develop economically. Because Litton Industries was called in as a kind of development agency in those two areas, in which a million people or more lived in Greek society. Now, Litton Industries was to plan the economic development, to give its technical advice, and to be paid by the Greek government 11% of the total value of all economic projects for its consulting fee. And then it was to go out and to find the capital for these projects, and to be paid a 4% commission by the Greek government for finding this outside capital. Now, you know what the implication of that is. The implication is that there is not development in Greece; the implication is that growth does not mean

development; that what you do is to put into the hands of people whose motivation is profit, who don't concern themselves with what the needs of the Greek people may be or what the rational development of the resources may be — you put into their hands the capacity, really, to develop two major provinces of that society. And quite obviously, when Litton went to work and invited foreign capital into Greece, it invited it in for tourism, for luxury housing, for the things, after all, on which outside capital felt it could make a fast killing.

The impact, you see, of this foreign investment in Greece, the impact of this Truman Doctrine democracy which opens the market, is to mean that Greek resources are sometimes exploited but not developed for Greek industry; one thinks of bauxite, for example. Secondly, the consumer market is often a consumer market in luxury goods to cater to a very narrow sector of Greek society in the absence of things that are necessary. That in the third place, the decisions of what will be produced and what will be developed are left into foreign hands. All of that, you see, prototypical not only of Greece, but of Laos, of South Vietnam, of South Korea, of all of those places where the free market society has developed. And then came the crisis.

And, you see, this is the interesting thing about imperialism, and that is that it can never calculate what may happen. And so, by 1963, something peculiar was happening in Greece. In the first place, the Karamanlis regime, that kind of police state that had been established, had gone too far. The elections were too coercive. The stealing of the elections was too obvious. In 1961, according to Papandreou, 100,000 votes had been falsified in the city of Athens itself. And you see what that meant: it meant that the center, now unified into the Center Union Party by 1961, resented it. They were part of the elite too. They wanted their share, and they began to attack the regime for falsifying elections, for suppressing public liberties. And then there were these offshoots of these attacks. They began to attack corruption; that, through the use of American aid, all sorts of special interests were getting rich. And they began to attack even the kind of infestation that Karamanlis had to American foreign policy. Well, you see, it was embarrassing. Of all of the prime ministers of Europe, Karamanlis was the only one, openly, to congratulate John Kennedy at the time of the Bay of Pigs [*laughter, muttering*]. And, consequently, quite obviously, seemed to be so much an agent that he was in contempt, and the center began to cut its teeth on that, and the attack began to get really quite wide.

But you're still talking about two elite parties. The big change is that the Center Union begins to get a mass base. And, here, understand that even if you have growth without development, you begin to get certain morphological changes in a society. In Greece, you don't get the great growth of a working class because you have very little industrial progress. But you do get, through all of this aid, through all of this foreign investment, you do get an increase in urbanization. You get an increase in the service trades, in the white collar trades; you begin to get clerks in offices,

salespeople, more professionals: in other words, of a petty bourgeoisie that resents being totally excluded from Greek public life. In addition to that, you have this wild inflation in the early '60s that begins to bring the peasants and the workers rely, for the first time since the end of the civil war, back into protest. The peasants begin to find voice. You begin to get insurrectionary movements among tobacco farmers in Macedonia, among the Corinth grape growers who simply cannot make ends meet, who suddenly find that they have a declining real income; workers who go out on wildcat strikes. All of that begins to crystallize behind the attacks of the Center Union.

And Georgios Papandreou — that same Papandreou who had been the British agent in 1943 and '44 — Papandreou, after all, suddenly finds that he has a mass on his hands. And the spring of 1963 is a turning point period, because that left-wing party, EDA, begins to coordinate its propaganda. It makes a great campaign for imprisoned trade unionists, for those who had been in prison because they had been too militant. It begins to demand peace and neutrality and getting out of NATO. And you have that orchestrated, along with the attacks of the center party on the corruption of the regime.

And then, an event; and it happens in April of 1963, and there is a deputy of EDA, of this left-wing party, and he is a doctor and he is distinguished. And he has, really, a great public. And his name is [Grigoris] Lambrakis. And Lambrakis goes to Salonika in April of 1963 to make a speech demanding that Greece get out of NATO, that it be neutralist, that it fights for peace, that it end its connections with American imperialism. And everywhere the police are, everywhere there are right-wing fascistic groups, and Lambrakis's life is in danger. And as he is at the head of that procession in Salonika, on a motorcycle, he is assaulted and brutally murdered. And the murder of Lambrakis, who really was a distinguished guy and a great loss to the Greek Left, the murder of Lambrakis was fantastic. The funeral in Athens brought out half a million people. And consequently, there was from that time a movement so great in the streets that finally, on the 18th of May of 1963, Karamanlis — despite all that support from the monarchy, from the army, from the Americans — threw in the sponge and resigned.

And there were elections, then, in October. And those elections in October came, really, under the sign of the first mass movements since the civil war. And, in those elections, the Papandreou Center Union Party won. And they won a clear majority of the seats, and, at the beginning of 1964, suddenly you have a progressive government in Greece. And it's not socialist, and it's certainly not revolutionary. But it's the beginning of a new start. It is more neutralist, more anti-imperialist; it really thinks about the plight of poor people. So there is an opening.

And it was written about that period by [Vassilis] Vassilikos. And Vassilikos, in this magnificent book *Z* — which is about the murder of Lambrakis, and that the murderers were then let off by

the police — tells us how it was at that funeral and what the mood was as this Papandreou government came in. And, you see, he talks a little bit poetically about the soul of Lambrakis somehow affecting these people at the funeral:

"And so between two heavens, the soul followed the procession of the resurrection. She knew well now that the body had not died, since a whole people thronged around its coffin. She knew too that immortality is whatever survives in the memory of others. And the cry that rang throughout the journey and throughout the entire funeral was 'He lives.' No one would admit that death existed in the realm of the idea. Death exists only for the individuals who one day discover with stupefaction that their private little lives come to an abrupt end. And at that point, they panic, and they shut themselves up in psychiatric hospitals to recover. There is no death, when by falling you help a people to rise, when your monument has become the very scale and standard of a people.

"When they arrived there the soul came to rest in profound anguish, like the kite at its zenith when you see it suddenly halt — a motionless speck in the sun, while on the ground the kite string in the child's hand relaxes, just as above deep waters his fishing line slackens inward without revealing the exact spot where it had touched the sea's floor. So proving, once again, that up and down are the same. Arrived there, the soul came to rest, waiting for them to set the body down so that she could descend, waiting for the earth to receive him so that she could hold head high. Up and down, body and soul making only one. Until, after come to a halt, above the high body of the halted world. At one point she had to descend again for a clearer view of an old woman dressed in black, who darted through the crowd, pulling her hair hysterically, and crying just as they laid him in the grave: 'Wake up, Z, we're waiting for you! Wake up!' Which sent a shock through the crowd for this old woman, with her simple words, had expressed, precisely, what an entire people was feeling at that moment and would feel for the next year."

And so there was that moment in '64 and '65. And it would be the last moment. The king got in the way; the Americans got in the way; the colonels got in the way; and the Truman Doctrine democracy then proceeded on its way after 1965. Remember all that. It's impossible, you see, if you are a people like the Greeks, to cope with this kind of sheer power, literally impossible to make even the movement of 1964 and '65 come out to any kind of viable terms. In the final analysis, it all gets wound up within a great international complex. It gets wound up in the recession of American power, if that recession, then, is a reality in our own time. And if there is a recession, then the Greeks will act again. Don't forget that. [*applause*]