

China, cont'd

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Now, let's try to define the problem. You see, when you come to the turn of the century and you are dealing with China, you are dealing with a country which is very, very much like a great number of contemporary Third World societies. By the turn of the twentieth century, China literally had only one of two alternatives. Realistically, there was no other option for China but either, on the one hand, to disintegrate into a state of real political decomposition and economic subservience or to make a social revolution. In other words, the option for China as you come into the twentieth century is either to fall to nadir of a colony or a semi-colony — something that can be battered upon the imperialistic powers of the outside — or make that kind of social revolution which really will break the traditional social and political armature of the China state. Which, in other words, can really pose the question of the great internal contradictions of Chinese society, which compose that central contradiction of the villages, and finally pose the question of whether the peasants are going to get the land or not; and which ultimately can pose the question of a radical strategy of development, which can end that kind of secular and millennial poverty under which the Chinese peasantry has really lived.

Those, essentially, were the options of Chinese society as you came into the twentieth century. And in a sense, what we have derived from that fifty-year history — from those 1840s when the treaty system first imposed Western imperialism, down to the 1890s when imperialism becomes accelerated and really roots itself in Chinese society — what we have derived from our overview of that fifty-year period is precisely the fact that the two components of the Chinese crisis have not only continued, but they have become by the end of the nineteenth century irreducible facts. And those two components of the Chinese crisis are something that we must always keep in mind. And we must realize how very close they are to any kind of a model that we have in mind of a Third World society.

In the first place, after all, that the market of China, the very vast market of China by the end of the nineteenth century became more of a pole of attraction to the West. It wasn't something simply that was desirable for raw materials or for the selling of industrial goods to those who were the advanced capitalist powers. But the China market, if you please, had become an imperative. It had become something really essential. Because you must always keep in mind that capitalism, in its advanced stage at the end of the nineteenth century, has passed to that level that we call monopoly capitalism: that essentially you are dealing with capitalistic societies in

which the structure of industry has become large, in which the concentration of ownership has become very great and very advanced. And that means essentially that there is a need for those markets for profitable investment that will not create overproduction at home, that will not use that great production facility at home in order to glut the market. And you have to find those profitable outlets for investment — something like the vast mainland of Asia, after all. Something like the China market becomes much more than an attraction; it really becomes almost a kind of imperative within the framework of capitalist health.

And the second component of that crisis, which is that the strategy of the Chinese ruling class to try to reconstruct China within the framework of the traditional armature — socially and politically, to try to reform China within the framework of the old society that was doomed and destined to failure. Whether you are talking about the T'ung-chih, about that movement of restoration of the 1870s or '80s, in which the ruling class of China tried, after all, to construct a kind of functioning, agricultural, hierarchical society, or whether you are talking about *yang-wu* — that movement of modernization of the 1880s and '90s, which was a very timed movement of modernization; tried, if you please, to infuse a few cells of industrialization or a few cells of capitalism within that very inert, agricultural body politic of China, those kinds of strategies, no matter how honorable the Chinese gentry really was — those strategies were destined to failure.

And so you come to the 1890s, and you see something very staggering. And that is that the Chinese state, after all, cannot prevent the imperialist powers from penetrating their country. The agricultural economy of China cannot resolve the population problem. That population is constantly increasing and creating terrific pressure upon the available resources. The Chinese ruling class cannot resolve, and cannot even pose the central contradiction of the village, because that would be to put on the line, to put on the block, its own ownership of land. And it even cannot really pose the question of capitalist expansion, because that capitalism will come to undermine that hierarchical structure which is the very basis for its rule within the framework of China.

And so we come to that very historic twenty-five-year period, the twenty-five-year period which is the transition into contemporary Chinese history. We are talking about those years from 1894 to 1919, in which certain very staggering things happen, in which the Western imperialist powers, with Japan at their side, gnawed at the foundations of the Chinese state and society until it almost ate them away — a period in which the monarchy collapsed in 1911, in which the Republic was established in 1912, and most important, in which the social and economic forces for a social revolution emerged and really began to incubate within the cauldron of China.

And so we go to that starting point, which is that expansion and acceleration of foreign imperialism in China. God, a terrible period for the Chinese, because it is a period called the

breakup of China: the period really when China, that historic civilization, almost lost its sovereignty to the outside, effectively lost its economic sovereignty.

And the shock of recognition came in the year 1894, because that was the year of the Sino-Japanese War. Now, it's one thing for China to be buffeted by those "white dogs" with their modern inventions, but for China to be penetrated by another Asiatic power, by an Oriental power that had always been a cultural satrapy of China, that was a terrific shock of recognition. But, you see, the Japanese had gone through their modernization. They had gone through that movement known in Japanese history as the Meiji of the 1860s and '70s. And Japan, in order to prevent herself from being imperialized from the outside — in order to join the expansionist powers and to rival with them had superimposed or grafted an industrial structure and a modern military structure upon a traditional body and social politic — in other words, it had made its industrialization and its militarization, and superimposed them upon the traditional imperial state and the traditional social structure of Japan until, by the 1890s, it was ready to take on China and ready to rival the West.

And the issue in the war with China was Korea. And it was over Korea that China had exercised a suzerainty from time immemorial. And Japan wanted hegemony over Korea. And consequently, in the summer of 1894, there was a rebellion in Korea, and the rulers there called upon the Chinese to help them. And the Chinese sent a small force to Korea. But the Japanese sent a much bigger force. And, by the 23 of July of 1894, they (the Japanese) had suppressed the Korean rebellion. And they had installed a puppet government in Seoul so that Korea was falling under Japanese control, and then the Japanese ordered the Chinese to withdraw their military force. The Chinese government couldn't accept that and on the 1st of August of 1894, declared war against Japan. And that war was no contest. The Japanese quickly sunk half the Chinese fleet — showing how superficial the *yang-wu*, or the modernization of China, had been — landed forces on the coast of China, and by the beginning of 1895, they had forced an armistice with the Chinese, and finally forced them on the 17th of April of 1895 to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki. That treaty, after all, was such a kind of embarrassment and shame to Chinese nationalism.

And that Treaty of Shimonoseki that the Japanese impose, because it is a dictated peace, begins to break up China. Because what it does is to say, first off, that China no longer has any suzerainty over Korea, and it is the beginning of Japanese hegemony over that country. Secondly, that the island of Taiwan, or Formosa, shall be passed to the Japanese; that the little Pescadores Islands, between, Formosa and the Chinese mainland shall be passed to the Japanese; that the peninsula at the southern end of Manchuria, known as the Liaotung Peninsula, that Liaotung Peninsula shall now pass to the Japanese; that the Chinese shall pay an indemnity of 200 million tael, 200 million Chinese dollars, to the Japanese for the burden of that war. The Japanese got a great deal. They didn't keep it all.

They didn't keep it all... and I note that, parenthetically, because there is inter-imperialist rivalry. Always imperialist rivalry — you cannot get that great international fraternity of thieves. And consequently, what happened was that the Russians looked over there and they said, "The Japanese are getting too much." And especially, they looked at that Liaotung Peninsula, and they said, "No!" Because, you see, the Russians were interested in building a railroad line across Manchuria, or more concretely, to complete the Trans-Siberian line which went across Siberia and which they wanted to have its terminus in Vladivostok. And the way to do it most simply was to cut through Harbin, in Manchuria, and move directly to Vladivostok. And for the Japanese to have a foothold there? No, no. So the Russians packed with the Germans and the French, and they put their screws on the Japanese. And finally the Japanese, in November of 1895, had to give the Liaotung Peninsula back to the Chinese. Then the Russians got into the game. And they said to the Chinese, "You see, we have got the Liaotung peninsula back for you. In addition, we make you a big loan so you can pay the first installment of your indemnity. We don't have the money, but the French, they'll provide it. And, consequently, we make this loan, and you are our friend." And so the concord comes in 1896, permits the Russians to build that trans-Siberian railway to complete trans-Siberian across through Harbin and into Vladivostok.

And the results for the Chinese were terrific. Because, you see, it was a shame; you see, it showed how bankrupt the central government was; you see, it showed how superficial the modernization was. But, more than that, what that Sino-Japanese War did was to open the door to the breakup of China. Because what happened in 1898 and 1899, is the development of what we call leaseholds and the development of spheres of influence in which not one single imperialist power can control China. But they make a kind of compact, informal, so that each has its area or its zone of influence. And it begins with the Germans.

And the Germans were up in Shantung. And they had sent their missionaries to Shantung in fairly large numbers, that northeastern province right south of Manchuria. And in Shantung they wanted a naval base, because the German fleet operating in the Far East had no base along the China coast. And, consequently, in November of 1897, two German Catholic missionaries happened to be killed. Well, it wasn't accidental. The Chinese did it deliberately. And, consequently, the death of those two missionaries was a great springboard for indemnity. And so in March, the 7th of March of 1898, the Chinese made an agreement with the Germans in which they got a leasehold of ninety-nine years over the part of Tsingtao — the port of Tsingtao, the major port of Shantung, and there the Germans would have sovereignty — the Chinese would be out. But more than that: a leasehold is one thing over a city, but you get then an intra-structural sphere of influence. That's what imperialism is about. You get 100 kilometers radiating in every direction in which the Germans have the priority to build the railroads, to work the mines, to take up the land, to exploit the minerals, to do what they will — good deal.

And there for others. And so that's the 7th of March of 1898. Two weeks later, the Russians get their treaty. That comes the 27th of March of 1898. And it completes their little surrounding of Manchuria because, in their compact with the Chinese, they get a twenty-five-year leasehold over Port Arthur, which is the port on the Liaotung Peninsula. And they get also the right to build a trunk line, or a branch line, from that trans-Manchurian called the South Manchurian Railway, which will cut from Harbin through Mukden and finally terminate in Port Arthur. And you know what that means: that the Russians immediately establish what is called the Russo-Chinese Bank. And they go into Manchuria, not only to build the railroads, but to exploit the timber, to exploit whatever mineral resources they can find.

And the French followed. And the French followed in April of 1898. And theirs was a vague treaty with the Chinese. They said there are just these three big provinces in the south of China, and they really are ours because they do front on Indochina. And so, you see, in Yunnan and in Kwangsi and in Kwangtung, we make an agreement with the Chinese, say the French, in which no other foreign power can ever be given a concession. And the south of China becomes, vaguely, a French sphere of influence.

And the British were not holding their breath. And they gave, after all, a big loan at good interest to the Chinese in February of 1898 — £1.5 million to make the second payment on that indemnity to the Japanese — and in return, they got a sphere of influence, vaguely, over what was called the Yangtze basin. And since the Yangtze flows through all of China, and begins, after all, in Shanghai and goes flowing through all of the central provinces of China — well, you know where the British were, swarming all over China.

And the Americans were holding their breath. And they were in Hawaii, and they were in the Philippines, and by rights a Pacific power. And consequently, Secretary of State John Hay, in that context, in September of 1899, issues the Open Door Notes: those notes that will go to Japan, to Great Britain, to France, to Germany, to Russia, to Austria, but not to China. Note it well, because the Open Door Notes have nothing to do with the territorial integrity of China. And the reason they are so easily accepted by the other powers is that they imply, and they explicitly say, that the system in China is sphere of influence. Because what the Open Door Notes demand, after all, is that inside the spheres of influence, American capitalism shall have the right to trade without discrimination and to invest without discrimination.

All of which means that China becomes a great big dish out of which everyone is eating. And economically, it begins to disintegrate into really the province of outside powers. Look at the measurements, look at the foreign loans: between 1894 and 1899, in that five-year period, that China borrows 370 million Chinese dollars, or Chinese tael. And when you think that the annual budget of China is only 80 million Chinese dollars, then you understand what we mean when we

say that, at the turn of the century, one-fourth of the annual budget of China was devoted to service on the debt — in other words, was just to pay interest to foreign bankers. Or consider what the flooding in of Western industrial goods meant to China. Consider it in terms of the bread-up of artisan crafts. Consider it just from the viewpoint of the data on the unfavorable balance of trade. Because that unfavorable balance of trade, in 1894, was of the order of 25 million Chinese dollars. By 1899, it was of the order of 80 million Chinese dollars. Which meant that China, after all, was draining off her wealth, drawing off her precious materials. Or consider what we call the modern sector of the Chinese economy. And you must note it. Because what there was of a modern sector — the railroads, the mines, a few factories in the part city — that was in the hands of the West. And that modern sector is important. It begins slightly to change the Chinese structure. But it is always built and directed, after all, to the purposes that are outside and beyond the borders of China.

And how do you react to that? And that is the problem. And the problem is what will the Chinese state do? What will the Chinese ruling class do? And, if the state and the ruling class can't do anything, what will other people do?

And what happens between 1898 and 1911 is fantastically interesting. Fantastically interesting because it exhausts the possibilities — note it well in the Third World — it exhausts the possibilities of reforming inside the structure. The Chinese case is a classic case from that point of view. There are three successive stages of attempting to cope with this problem of the disintegration of China. One is the so-called radical reform movement of the summer of 1898. The second is what I call conservative anti-imperialism, by which I mean the Boxer movement of 1900, which is so curiously exploited by the ruling class of China. And finally, I mean that kind of desperate reformism between 1901 and 1911 by the state itself: desperately trying to save itself, only to find that reformism boomerangs and that what it is doing is broadcasting the seed of its own destruction. And let's look at those three stages.

And we talk about radical reformism. And when we talk about radicals, we mean those who really are Confucians and fed up with all the reactionary Confucians who are hiding their heads in the sand and won't change at all. And radical because they have a greater sense of urgency than the people of the 1870s and 1880s: those who were of the T'ung-chih, who wanted a little bit of change but not enough. But we say radical reformers, and underscore that, because these are elite people, these are Confucian scholars with a modernist viewpoint who want to reform the traditional state, the traditional monarchy and the traditional society. They are people who think it is possible, if you please, to make a new deal — who think it is possible to graft something onto a structure in which you do not pose the question of mass mobilization — direct their program to an elite, hoping the elite will make a revolution from the top, in which you do not pose the question of agrarian reform because you are of the landlord class and you cannot do that; in

which what you are really trying to do is to encompass a little bit of the science and modernization of the West, a little bit of the control capitalism of the West in order to strengthen the traditional state and the traditional society.

And so it is K'ang Yu-wei who is the chief of that particular position. And K'ang Yu-wei, after all, is a leading Confucian scholar, a man who came from an upper rank Mandarin family and who opens a school in 1891 in order to teach his version of Confucianism. And what K'ang Yu-wei says is that Confucius has been misinterpreted: that he never meant to congeal institutions for all time; that he was, in his own time, a modernist, and felt that you had to change to meet new needs, to encompass new knowledge. And so he talked about Confucianism being evolving or evolutionary, and that the Chinese had the right and the responsibility to integrate this new science, this modernity, into their social and political structure. And as a reformer, he had a certain school of intellectuals, of Confucian intellectuals who listened to him, but no clout until 1898. And in 1898, K'ang Yu-wei is taken into the government and becomes, really, the man of the so-called Hundred Days of Reform, one hundred days that stretched from the 11th of June of 1898 until the 16th of September in which, from the government, comes a veritable flood of reforms.

And the background for that is terribly interesting. Because, you see, the emperor was the guy named Kuang-hsu. And Kuang-hsu was a timid kind of person who, after all, had been for a long time under the influence of his aunt, the Dowager Empress Tz'ü-hsi. Tz'ü-hsi, about whom Pearl Buck has written such a magnificent biography and book, was really a reactionary. Sorry to say this about a woman in history, but Tz'ü-hsi was obviously avaricious, obviously scheming — not a good person from the point of view of progress, whatever it happens to be. And there she is in the backdrop, and she doesn't want any change, and obviously is going to pull all kinds of strings. And, you see, Kuang-hsu is desperate in 1898, because the West is there, and Japan, and it's taking away his country. And so there is a central administrative bureau, kind of a planning group, called the Tsung-li. And it is that central administrative committee that he brings K'ang Yu-wei and his reformers. And they get going!

And they issue all of these reforms. And the reforms are interesting although they're never put into effect; they're frustrated whenever they come off the drawing board, because the mandarins, the bureaucrats, really won't enforce them at all. But look at the direction of these reforms. The reform of administration — simply, the bureaucracy — eliminate a lot of sinecures, of unnecessary posts. And already that's a good move, but already frighteningly certain of the bureaucrats, who began to see nothing but begging in their future. And consequently, they begin to push off some of the elite. Or consider the reform in education. K'ang Yu-wei wanted modern schools, and he wanted a modern curriculum. Or think of his reform for founding chambers of commerce, chambers of commerce which would stimulate an indigenous Chinese capitalism.

You see, they were reforms of modernization. But here are the two points. In the first place, those reforms were never directed to the mass but only to an elite. In the second place, they only never directed to the structural problems of administration or the problem of getting a more efficient bureaucratic ruling class. And in the third place, of course, they were undermined. And they were undermined by September of 1898. The Dowager Empress has had it. And consequently, she makes a little plot behind the back of her nephew, who was the emperor. She says her nephew is out to kill her — which he didn't have the guts to do anyway — and consequently she makes a plot of army officers, of high bureaucrats. They make the emperor a prisoner; they imprison the reformers, they force some of them to flee, they execute some of them. The Hundred Days dies.

And you do not have a mini-Meiji. And you do not have a revolution from the top. And consequently, that effort to modernize the structure meets interior problems, and it meets conceptual problems. And you move from that to a second stage. What, then, do you do with these Western and Japanese imperialists in China? What do you do? And so you come to this fascinating episode of what is really conservative anti-imperialism, if you can imagine such a curious contradiction in terms. You're dealing with the Boxer moment.

Now, granted, the Boxer fascinates me, and it fascinates me for a number of reasons. First of all, it played a very mini role in my own existence at one time, as I first started to do this magnificent thing of teaching, something that really is so extraordinary. And I began years ago in Oberlin College, and Oberlin College is a very small college with a very, very outsize kind of self-reputation. And consequently, one thing that it has, that was true, is a kind of a missionary spirit — every student in Oberlin had a kind of built-in halo — and consequently, you went down there, and you discovered that there was a mission that was literal. In other words, there was an Oberlin in China, a mission school in Shansi province. And when I first went to Oberlin — because those were days when, you know, all of us were supposed to be kind of latter-day Leonardos or something — I taught everything under the sun. And among other things I was supposed to teach on the history of China and the history of Japan, because I was 23 and I knew everything, and consequently it had no problem for me as I went down there. And I began to do this, and that's how I met all of those people who were connected with the whole China establishment at Oberlin — H. H. Kung, who was the brother-in-law of Chiang Kai-shek, who was on the board of overseers at the college, and so forth and so on. And then I got disturbed about a lot of things. And I was walking across Tappan Square one day, which is the central square of that dismal village, and Tappan Square has an arch at one end called the Shansi Arch. And you read the inscription, and the Shansi Arch was put up at one end of Tappan Square in dedication to the Oberlin missionaries...

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... and then I went to Ohio State.

And, suffice it to say, after that going on, the Boxer Rebellion became a very compelling question for me. Really, what was it about? Well, socially, there's no question about it: it was a peasant movement. 70% of those who were enrolled in Boxer armies, those young people, those young boys and those young girls in the Boxer movement, were generally of peasant stock, about 70%. The others, the other 30%, all of those types that you find in the secret societies: that is, the discharged soldiers, the deserters, the magicians, the ruined boatmen, the ruined artisans, and so forth. And at the beginning, the Boxer movement was both anti-dynasty and anti-imperialist. In other words, it was against the Western intrusion, but it was also against the dynasty, the Manchus, for permitting this to happen. And what is the fantastic historical fact about the Boxer movement is that it gets turned around: the anti-Manchu part drops. And the Manchu Dynasty, or the reactionaries in China, really exploit the Boxer movement with the idea of using this mass movement against imperialism in order to oust the West, so that they can really settle down behind a figurative Chinese wall, and not have these outside influences which will upset the Chinese state or Chinese society.

Look, it goes something like this. That what you have, you see, when you get to the end of the 1890s is a very, very severe agricultural conjuncture. In other words, the peasants are really hurting with a profundity that it's hard to convey, because, certainly, of the population explosion. Between 1873 and 1898, the population increased 9%, but the amount of land in cultivation increased 1%. Which means, you see, that you have so many who have no land, who are beggars, who are vagabonds, and so much indebtedness, because so many more mouths have to be fed, after all, from the same little sliver of land. Add to that agricultural conjunction a terrific focusing in upon the evils of imperialism, the evils of imperialism which mesh with this agricultural conjuncture. That's the point.

Because wherever you look, you see the West disrupting your economic base, first of all because the missions take land away — they themselves, after all, have land. Because, in the second place, they (the West does) destroy the artisan industries which were a kind of a balance within the villages. In the third place, because the very existence of these trading centers, in the coastal cities of China — many that in those areas begin to capitalize agriculture — in other words, there is a possibility of feeding more people in cities. And, consequently, the landlords begin to oust the tenants. They begin to take the land over themselves, because there's now a new market that the imperialists have created in these coastal cities. All of these things, you see, are conjunctures with this initial base or this initial start of the agricultural crisis.

Now, all of that means that, by the time you come to the end of the 1890s, you have one indisputable fact: that the poor are getting poorer in the villages and that the rich are getting

richer; that there is a movement toward the concentration of land and toward the loss of land by the mass of the peasantry. Now, this, and note it well, is most exaggerated in the province of Shantung. And it's in the province of Shantung that the Boxer movement really emerges and becomes strongest. And Shantung is very special. It had been hit by all kinds of natural cataclysms in the 1880s and '90s, flood after flood; the Yellow River flooding its banks, and that province of Shantung being inundated, thousands of villages being ruined in this process. Secondly, a province more heavily taxed in the land tax than any other in China, disastrous taxes by the late 1890s. But more than that: that the West is there in force. In other words, that the Germans especially not only have taken over their leasehold in 1898, and their sphere of influence, but there are all kinds of missionaries, thousands of missionaries and converted Christian Chinese. And that in the Shantung province, which is the birthplace of Confucius. And so you begin to get, in the middle of the 1890s, a tax upon missionaries, a tax upon the symbols of the West in that province. And it's out of that province that the Boxers grow.

Now, who are the Boxers? The Boxers are the Society of the Harmonious and Just Fists. And what they thought was that you keep yourself trim, you keep yourself strong: you have, after all, a strong body, and you keep a clear mind, and you can overcome your enemy, whether that enemy is natural or that enemy is human. You look into the Boxers, and it's a syncretic movement. It's a movement that is both of the past and of the modern time; a movement that really roots back into the medieval period and a movement that is of the nineteenth and twentieth century, certainly like a secret society of the past, full of magic, full of charms, full of all kinds of formula — potions, for example, to make rain, potions to drive away the foreigner, and so forth. A bit on the medieval side, certainly; a bit on the magical side. Secondly, old-fashioned from the point of view of hating the symbols of progress: tearing down telegraph poles, tearing down all of the rail lines that they can find; in other words, becoming Chinese Luddites, as it were. In other words, those who see the symbols of their enslavement, and consequently begin to attack the symbols rather than the cause.

All of that can be said about the Boxers. But look: it is the first major mass movement against imperialism. That that mass movement against imperialism got to be turned by the Chinese state to its own purposes is unfortunate. And it happened this way. In 1898 and 1899, the Boxers are shouting slogans against the Manchu and against the foreigner. And what happens is that, in Shantung especially, the officials come down very hard in their repression against the radical leaders of the Boxer movement. They began to organize in what you would call brigades, or they began to organize in little armed bands. Boys and girls, both of them — not in mixed ones, but in separate bands — youngsters between twelve and eighteen, these Boxer bands. And they're shouting, in 1898, their epithets against the regime and against the foreigner. And the repression comes down hard until, by 1899, the slogan changes, and the slogan is, "Protect the Manchu and oust the West." And, you see, the radicals have either been executed or they have been put in

prison. And consequently, the movement becomes a frontrunner for the regime which thinks that it can oust the West with this kind of movement, and consequently save itself.

And so the movement crests by June of 1900. It had been in Shantung. It moved off into Honan, into Shansi, even into Inner Mongolia. But on the 13th of June of 1900, the Boxer bands enter the city of Peking. And Peking is the capital, and it is there that you have the foreign legations. And here the Manchu state will play its little game. And so it says to the foreign legations, "You've got to get the hell out of Peking." And their idea is to frighten the foreign legations, and they will not be frightened. Certainly, they're not going to leave because of these Boxer bands. And the Boxers are heated up, and on the 20th of June of 1900, they kill the German minister [Clemens] von Ketteler. And at that point, the Chinese state steps in and says that it is the presence of the foreigners that has provoked this. And the 21st of June of 1900, the Chinese state declares war on all of the consolidated diplomatic powers, and this with these bands of 12- to 18-year-olds, plus some contingents of the Chinese army. And what they do is to besiege the legations in Peking. And those legations have about 500 civilian personnel; they've got above 3,000 Chinese Christians within that compound, they've got about 400 armed guards, but they are kept two months really under that siege, until such time as the West responds with force.

And it's the Kaiser, since it is Shantung, it is the Kaiser who really preaches this crusade. And when an international force is raised to take care of this Boxer threat — when the West, after all, is just full of terrific racial hate and feels that these uppity Chinese have to be shown a lesson — it is Kaiser William II, not known for his gentility, who preaches a crusade and says to the German troops who march off to meet in Tientsin and then to march on Peking — he says to them, "Remember, no mercy and no prisoners. It is Europe against Asia. It is civilization against the yellow peril." And so an international force of 16,000, that includes Germans and French and Americans and British and Russians and, in order to fight the "yellow peril," Japanese. And that international force then moves against Peking. And all told, the Boxers, in all of their years of activity, had probably done in about 20,000 Chinese Christians or missionaries. And when the West got to China, that was child's play.

And they got to the city of Peking, and they lifted the siege immediately. And then they went to the Imperial Palace, and they pillaged it. And they took everything that wasn't nailed down, and they killed right and left. And they raped women, and women committed suicide literally by the hundreds and hundreds in the city of Peking. And they went to the villages in the surrounding provinces, and burned them to the ground, willy-nilly. And then the flood receded. And they imposed the Protocol of the 7th of September of 1901. And it is proof positive that you do not play with imperialism, Boxer children. And it is proof positive that you cannot, after all, make that kind of folly of thinking that you are going to throw the West out and not really reform your structure internally. And so the Protocol of September 7 of 1901 was terrific. And it said

that the Chinese must now immediately abolish and ban all anti-foreign organizations on their soil; they must raze to ground certain fortifications in China; that they cannot impart arms into the Chinese state; that, in Peking, they must expand the foreign quarter, which is already in the middle of the city, and no Chinese will be admitted into that foreign quarter right in the center of the capital city of Peking. And then, as the final touch, 450 million Chinese dollars by way of indemnity, which mortgages the Chinese future. Terrific, terrific. Because it is shameful, and it is racial. And for the Chinese, of course, it does mortgage the future. And it means that the state is dying.

And so you come to that final leap. And that final leap are those years 1901 to 1911. And that is an effort that is most fantastic because, at that particular time, the state, those reactionaries who stifled the reform movement of 1898, they suddenly begin to reform. And they are desperate. And they reform in the fastest and the most vigorous fashion that the Chinese state ever has in the modern period. But it is too little, too late. And, note this, that they planted the seeds, by that reform, that would destroy them.

Consider several things. Consider educational reform: the educational reform was to plant new schools in China, to found the University of Peking in 1902, to reform the curriculum and make it modern, to abolish the old examination system of 1905. All for what purpose? All for the purpose of making a sophisticated, loyal, bureaucratic elite which could cope with modern problems. But that's not what happened. What happened was that you created a revolutionary intelligentsia. It is out of those new schools, and it is out of studying abroad — those Chinese students who went to Japan or America or Europe — and that is so characteristic. Those Third World students who go to their places and see the contrast between their own countries and the progress of other countries, and they became revolutionary.

Or, consider in the second place, the making of the new Chinese army. Thirty-five new military academies are founded, and modern military technology is introduced, and modern strategic concepts are taught, and Chinese young officers are sent abroad to Japan and other places to study. And what happens to them? And note that well, because Chinese nationalism hinges on these young modernist officers. They're the ones who have pride in their mission: they're supposed to defend the frontier, they're supposed to make China sovereign, and they're frustrated at every turn. Their major officers, the ones they serve under in the army, are still old corrupt reactionaries. And they know that you had really to define a new economy and a new politics if you are going to have strength in China. I'm talking about Chiang Kai-shek, who comes out of a military academy outside of Peking in these years, and goes off then to Japan to study in a military academy, and burns with a nationalistic indignation about the weakness of China. I'm talking about another at the same time, a boy from Szechwan who goes to a military academy in Yunnan in the south — all the way at the other end of China — and who become Chu Teh, the

leader of the Chinese Communist forces. Young officers of this kind who seed the revolution.

Or consider, if you please, the promise of parliamentary government, or of constitutional government, and the short-changing of the promise: an edict of September of 1906, in which the Chinese state says, "Yes, we believe in the principle of constitutionalism." Edicts then, of September and October of 1907, which fall so very short, that there will be a national parliament in China for the first time. But it will have no power — it will be just consultative. That there will be provincial parliaments, and they do meet in October of 1909 — provincial assemblies, but elected by such a narrow franchise that they include among their voters only the gentry. In the province of Szechwan for example, you have 118,000 voters out of 38 million people.

And consider, finally, that even this reformism doesn't last. It peters out in the imperial line itself. Well, the imperial line peters out. Tz'ü-Hsi, who is the last of the "muscular" Manchus, dies. She was aged, and she died in 1908. And she is succeeded by a great-nephew, P'u-i, age five. And the regent is Prince Ch'un. And Prince Ch'un is a reactionary, and surrounds himself with terrible Manchus. And nobody wants to reform, but that's not the problem.

The problem is that by that time, friends, the forces have developed that will pierce that structure. And that is the point, because you are dealing with something that you must understand. And that is that no matter what else imperialism does, it serves in any society as a steamroller, and it changes and pushes into rubble and crumbles the regime as it existed. And so imperialism did that in China. And let us say that before 1914, the investment of the West got big: that it changes from \$700 million in investment by 1914. There are railroads, there are mines being worked; these are all primarily owned by the West. What does that have to do with China? These two things: that you do create a modern sector of the economy, however small it is; and that, in the shadow of that modern sector of the economy, you do create the shadowy outlines of a national bourgeoisie. That something that happens on the coattails of that modern sector; that you begin to get certain Chinese merchant, certain Chinese bankers — to be sure, they're frustrated; they can't get off the ground; they don't have a tariff regime to protect their industries against the West; they don't have state subsidies because the state treasury is so empty — all of that is a frustration. But you begin to get, in the wake of this modern sector, a Chinese interest, however small.

Or put it in these conceptual terms: that by 1911, you have created forces that will make a revolution. And those forces are four in number. And they are, in a sense, contradictory forces. And that tells you why the Revolution of 1911 and '12 is so strange in China, and why communism ultimately will come to straighten it out. And the forces are these: there is a Chinese bourgeoisie, a very disparate group, and small. And they are certain national bourgeois types — certain industrialists, certain bankers — mainly they are compradors, mainly they work for the

West. But for the most part, they are concentrated in the coastal cities, and that gives them something of a collected public opinion. And they burn with resentment about the fact that China cannot develop her own resources. And in the second place, you get — not tied to them organically, but like fellow-travelers — you get those two modernist groups. You get the intelligentsia out of the universities: the students, the writers, the journalists, those that came out of the new education, most of them who are in exile, who go to Japan, who go to Europe, who really become revolutionaries and want vaguely a socialist republic. And with those, the modernist officers: the sons, for the most part, of the gentry who don't want anything like a socialist republic, but want a strong China or a nationalist.

And the third interest: the perpetuity of the peasant uprising. That the peasant, by 1909 and 1910, in province after province, is making jacquerie, is making peasant riot and peasant upset more and more as the world condition disintegrates. And finally — and note it well — a provincial gentry, and that the gentry withdraws its support from the Manchu regime: that that gentry that had come to the defense of Manchus at the time of the Taiping Rebellion now is, for want of a better word, provincialized. It looks at its provinces, it looks at Szechwan or Hunan. It wants to control those provinces: it wants to make the railroads of its provinces; it wants to control the assemblies; it wants a strong China by a strong province.

And what binds those crazy groups together? And that is the explanation of 1911 and '12. What binds those desperate groups together is nationalism. And nationalism, in 1911 and '12, means anti-Manchu and anti-West. But you can get more precise than that. The whole ambiguity, the whole frustration of the republican Revolution of 1911, is that you have no real common denominator. You have radicals on the one side and conservatives on the other, and what binds them together is that desperate feeling that China is going down the drain. And so you get groups growing. And the groups that grow begin to be not secret societies, but opposition parties — opposition organizations to overthrow the Manchu.

And you get a leader out of one of those efforts. And the leader, and the father of the Chinese Republic, of course: Dr. Sun Yat-sen. And Sun Yat-sen grows in that kind of a milieu of those radical students, of that kind of modernization, in the schools. And Sun Yat-sen is a product of that. And there is a curious contradiction in Sun Yat-sen, a curious contradiction. A boy from Canton and somebody who understood the peasantry in the area of Shansi and in the south of China — understood about secret societies and had an admiration for the Taiping Rebellion — and believed in direct action, believed in a direct revolution against the Manchu regime. And, on the other hand, is Westernized — is somebody who studies in Honolulu, somebody who studies in Hong Kong, becomes a doctor, admires the science and technology of the West, is in touch with the overseas Chinese, the business Chinese, and believes in Westernizing China. Strange combination, Sun Yat-sen.

And he and his friends found an organization by 1905, that organization known as the Secret Brotherhood. And the Secret Brotherhood of 1905 pronounces, through a speech of Sun Yat-sen, a program. And the program is known as the *san-min chu-i*, or the Three Principles of the People. And this is what the radical section of the Chinese Revolution will stand for, the Three Principles of the People: people's nationalism — drive out the Manchu; people's democracy — get constitutional government; people's wellbeing — reduce the land tax, reduce the pressures on the peasant. What a strange program for a revolutionary. You don't mention imperialism; you don't really mention the landlord class; you don't mention a resolution of the peasant problem. The essence, historically, of Sun Yat-sen is that he had a belief in a Chinese Republic and galvanized the belief of people around him. And he didn't make the Revolution.

And that came out of something else. Okay, you come to 1911, and suddenly there is a terrific kind of upset in the province of Szechwan. And Szechwan is a kind of paradigm case: a province where there are people that really want to build their own new China, to develop the resources of that province. And it centers around — you have to understand how powerful this is — it centers around the belief in a railroad, in the Szechwan to Hankow railroad. And it will be the provincials themselves, the gentry of that province; it will be the businesspeople; it will be what is called the *hsin-shang* — in other words, the alliance between the merchants and the gentry to develop the railroad facility of Szechwan. They will do it by themselves: it will not be foreign, it will not depend upon foreign money; it will depend upon the peasantry of Szechwan, who they begin to tax heavily for that project. And they make a railroad company, and they begin to build their railroad. And then, in May of 1911, that Manchu government nationalizes the problem of railroads — in other words, says the provinces cannot build their own railways, takes up Szechwan province, and makes a foreign loan from a foreign consortium of bankers in order to finance its production. And there is hell to pay in Szechwan. And there is a committee, a League for the Preservation of the Szechwan Railway: everybody that hated the Western hold through banks, everybody that hated the central government, everybody came together in a kind of riot in Szechwan over the summer of 1911.

And it was subdued. And it was subdued, but the seed was planted. And then suddenly, in "Double Ten," the 10th of October of 1911, comes the spark of that revolution. And the spark comes from the young, modernists officers. And it comes in the military garrison at Wuchang, in the neighboring province to Szechwan of Hupei. And in that military base at Wuchang, there is suddenly a military mutiny, and four battalions mutiny. They take over the arsenal. Soon, they take over the whole military base of Hupei. And what is interesting is that these officers had been in touch with the Brotherhood League. They had been in, though, with the radical intelligentsia. But when they took over the province, what they did was to choose a conservative general, Li Yüan-hung, as a leader to establish a kind of provisional, military government. And then they went to the provisional assembly of gentry and turned over civilian power to them. The point is

the military people, when they made the Revolution of 1911, were members of their class, were sons of the gentry, and in no way going to give this revolution over to the radical intelligentsia.

And so that movement in Hupei province spread from one province to the other until the Manchu Dynasty collapsed at the end of 1911. The regent resigned, the emperor abdicated, and suddenly there is a provisional republic. But what is it? And Sun Yat-sen wasn't even in China when it broke out. In Double Ten of 1911, he was in Denver, Colorado — very far from the Chinese Revolution — raising money in a tour of Europe and the United States in Chinese communities. And he rushed back, and got back to China in December of 1911. And alright, the Brotherhood League, then holds a meeting in Nanking, in December of 1911, and chooses Sun Yat-sen as president of a Republic. And a Republic is proclaimed the 1st of January of 1912.

But, you see, you have three foci of power: a shadowy government by these radicals at Nanking, then this provisional government in Hupei, and then Yüan Shih-k'ai. And Yüan Shih-k'ai is the head of the Imperial Army up in Peking. And he, after all, is very much on the scene. And what are you to do? And Sun Yat-sen then decides that his forces have no real mass base, which they didn't, and he resigns in March of 1912. And everybody agrees that Yüan Shih-k'ai, who is a terrible old reactionary, a military man, will become president of this Chinese Republic. And he becomes president, and he remains president until the 6th of June of 1916, when he had intended to establish a dynasty and reestablish the Chinese monarchy. Great destiny intervened, and he dropped dead. And the dynasty was not reestablished.

And what did that Chinese Revolution of 1911 and '12 really mean? It wasn't made by revolutionaries, in our sense of the word. What it meant was this: that the dynasty was finished; that the monarchy was not reestablished; that after Yüan Shih-k'ai, the state of China disintegrated into provincial warlordism. What disappeared was the context, the cadre, that kind of monarchical structure within which the traditional society always existed. In other words, the rationale, the *raison d'être*, for a hierarchical social order had disappeared with the disappearance of the monarchy. And the second thing was that, within the framework of that bogus Republic, the forces would explode in 1919, that would go beyond the dimensions of that 1911 and '12 experience. And you would make the real revolution.

That comes in 1919, which becomes the first spoke in the wheel that turns until 1949 — that thirty-year period which really begins to shake everything. And so you get down to 1919, with an experience that is very, very instructive of the things that simply will not do in the process of history in any Third World society, or any society. You can just go so long with measures that operated within the framework of non-resolution. [applause]