

U.S. Involvement in Algeria

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A couple of things before I begin. First of all, no matter how sophisticated you get about the ways of politics, or how sophisticated you get about the ways of the ruling class, it seems to me that you can't help but be a bit staggered — a little bit astonished, really — by what is essentially the arrogance, and by what is the pretension of imperialism. Of every stage of history that I know anything about imperialism, those who have been its progenitors, those who have made its theories, have had a colossal kind of pretension that what they were doing was an empire that was really going to last forever. And we're talking, after all, about that statement made thirty-three years ago by Henry Luce when he announced, after all, and trumpeted the American Century, and implied that what was coming into the world after the Second World War was an American empire that would last for at least a hundred years.

All of which assumes, you see, that the world is like clay, and that it can be shaped and molded simply to the needs, the market needs of capitalism. All of which assumes that the peoples of the world are really like inert objects, and that they are put down on earth simply to mine the minerals, simply to dig on the plantations, simply to live in penury for the greater glory of imperialism. But it tells us something more that is even more precisely arrogant, and that is that it assumes that all history is like one long linear road that leads to that kind of final culmination, which is the dominion in the world of advanced capitalism. That history is not what we know it to be: the seedground, after all, for the contradictions in society, the seedgrounds for struggle, the seedgrounds for movement and ultimately for revolution.

Well, you see, there was a great gap between the pretension and the reality. And only a decade after the Second World War — and we have documented it sufficiently now — we have already seen that that American empire, despite all of those vast resources in the hands of those architects of empire, already had reached limitations; that American policymakers could circumscribe and contain the Soviet bloc, but could not dismantle it; that American policymakers could feed all kinds of aid to Chiang Kai-shek, but they could not stop the progress and the success of the Communist revolution in China; that American policymakers could build up a tremendous armory of nuclear weaponry, but they could not resolve the contradictions in the Third World, nor prevent those contradictions from exploding into national liberation movements. What I'm saying is, in a sense, what Mao said twelve years after the Second World War when he posed the question of imperialism, and posed the question of the force of

imperialism, and said in that very famous remark that it is a "paper tiger."

But let us remain sober and calm, and not steeped in any creation. And let us remember, after all, some of the very harsh realities. Because if you are to battle in your lives and if you are to go into struggle, you ought never to go in disarmed, or you ought never to go in naively. And you must always remember, it seems to me, two premises that I hold to be axiomatic: that imperialists never give up their great benefits without a great struggle; and secondly, that ruling classes die very hard, and they fight to maintain themselves.

What I am saying is that, as I read the history of the last fifteen years, I read it with a double vision: that I see, in the first place, great cracks in the American empire, and I see those cracks growing larger. And I sense strains in the whole system of capitalism, not only as it centers here but as it centers in other places. And then I have another vision and that is that the ruling classes are tremendously vigilant about protecting their interest, and that they are almost infinitely rich in their capacity to devise strategies of counterrevolution. What I'm saying is that, in the long run, to be sure, imperialism will be dismantled and capitalism will give way to something else. But we live in the short run.

All of which means, after all, that we are talking about something profoundly important, and that is the adaptability of American policymakers and by the imperialist world: the adaptability to the loss of China, or to the development of national liberation movements. What I'm talking about is what you ought always be conscious of: that around the world, there are armies equipped as they have never been equipped; that around the world are constabularies with the latest devices for surveillance and for control; that around the world are techniques of psychological warfare, techniques of drugging populations; that around the world, there are technologies of torture that have been, after all, devised in imperialistic fields and brought back to the domestic field.

All of which is a very long preface for saying that, in the 1960s, American policymakers took note of and cognizance of the fact that China had been lost to the world market as they had defined it, that there were upsets in the Third World, that the empire was in danger, and they went about to try to devise a new technology in order to contain all that. What I'm talking about is the shift in tactics and strategy in the 1960s that we associate with the Kennedy administration, to begin with, from January of 1961 on, which is a major shift in orientation and in the development of power that moves from what had been traditional in the 1950s. Because traditionally, from the end of the Second World War to 1960, American strategy had been a military strategy based upon nuclear weaponry. It had been the strategy that we call "massive retaliation," and that massive retaliation strategy was geared toward a Third World War and especially toward a showdown with the Soviet Union. And it involved, after all, the building up of a large armory of nuclear weaponry, immense strategic air command bombers in large

numbers; it meant intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads; it meant, in other words, that if the Soviet Union were in any way to threaten the United States or the NATO allies — or, to read it differently, if it were to threaten the perimeter American empire — that there would be a retaliatory strike that would level the Soviet Union and destroy its potentiality for further action. And all of that was built in the 1950s at tremendous cost, and lay there.

And then the contradiction became apparent. And the contradiction was that the Soviet Union wasn't the threat, that it wasn't really damaging that American empire, but that the threat came from an unexpected place: from peoples who would not say no to their potentiality for change, and who lived in those Third World areas where the contradictions were so profound that they finally clustered around into movements. And those movements became revolutionary in import. In short: that there had to be a strategy to cope with guerrilla war; there had to be a strategy to cope with literally hundreds of thousands, millions of peasants who were armed with primitive weaponry, but who were not deterred simply by this stockpile of nuclear weapons.

All of that became the challenge of the late 1950s, as that challenge clustered in China and in Cuba and finally in Vietnam. And it is in 1959 that General Maxwell Taylor, who had been a former chief of staff, and who wrote a book that you really ought to look at because it presages an entire shift in strategy. It is a book called *The Uncertain Trumpet*, and it is General Taylor who is one of the first who says that massive retaliation is dead, and that what he calls "flexible response" is absolutely essential. And so we read: "Massive retaliation as a guiding strategic concept has reached a dead end. The many limited wars which have occurred since 1945 — the Chinese Civil War, the guerrilla warfare in Greece and Malaya, Vietnam, Taiwan, Hungary, the Middle East, and Laos, to mention only a few — are clear evidence that while our massive retaliatory strategy may have prevented the great war of World War III, it hasn't maintained the little peace." And the "little peace," in General Taylor's terms, quite obviously means the end of those upsets that really are so damaging to the potentiality of the world market. And so he goes on to call for what he calls "flexible response": "I'm speaking of a capability of reacting across the entire spectrum of possible challenges, for coping with anything from general atomic war to infiltration and aggression such as now threaten Laos and Vietnam."

And General Taylor set off a chain of thinking that crested the next year, in 1960, in a famous report that came from the Rockefeller Brothers' Fund. And that report was the work of a team headed by Henry Kissinger, of whom we hear later [*laughter*]. And in this report headed by Kissinger, called "International Security: The Military Aspect," we read: "Our mobile forces must be tailored to the gambit of possible limited war, which may range from conflicts involving several countries to the most minor police actions anywhere in the world." In other words, the call was for a strategy that you could not devise with nuclear weapons, but in order to confront these guerrilla struggles.

Now, that idea really took root when President Kennedy took office in January of '61. First, because Kennedy was intrigued with this idea, and named Taylor his chief military advisor; and brought in (from MIT) Walt Rostow, who was one of the architects of this flexible response, and brought in (from Harvard) McGeorge Bundy, who shared that position and then became his primary advisors in foreign affairs; and who made Robert McNamara the Secretary of Defense, who very much shared this idea. But it is Kennedy himself who was absolutely fascinated by it. He really was beady-eyed about the idea of meeting guerrilla war. And so we get Kennedy speaking at West Point, in 1962, this way: "Subversive insurgency is another type of war, wholly new in its intensity: war by guerrillas, by subversives, by insurgents, in short, by assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression; seeking victory by erosion and exhausting the enemy instead of honorably engaging [*laughter*]. In the course of those situations where we must encounter it, a wholly new kind of strategy, a wholly new kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of training."

And with that idea, Kennedy thought about a whole special force and became tremendously infatuated — in fact, I leave it to you to decide what it's all about — but became tremendously infatuated with the Green Berets and with the idea of these special army services. And so we have [Kennedy advisor] Teddy Sorensen telling us that in 1962, when Kennedy increased fivefold the number of those Special Forces (or Green Berets), he viewed these Green Berets this way — this from Sorensen's book on Kennedy: "He wanted the Green Berets to be dedicated, high-quality, elite corps specialists, trained in guerrilla war, able to live off the bush in a village or behind the enemy lines." And that was going to be the way: that we would have these Special Forces, they would know about guerrilla warfare, they would train others in it.

And Kennedy then went and looked at the military manuals, and he saw that none of them had anything about guerrilla war. And he began to read Mao, and he began to read Che [Guevara], and they were more exciting than the things he had read before. And consequently, he sought the answers there. And you begin to get that astonishing thing in which all kinds of foreign policy officers and military officers who are stationed in Third World scenes are given these texts to read and to study, so that they know something about what guerrilla warfare is. Now, Mao, as I've already told you, had said at an earlier time, "Now, let the enemy read our tracts as much as they want, because the only thing that they don't have that we have, and that they can supply, is a revolution. And consequently, if they read these tracts, what will it get them?"

But that became the training, so that what really was needed by the Kennedy administration was money: money from the Congress in order to increase the ground forces of the American army, and in order to increase these non-nuclear weapons which should be useful within the battlefield of guerrilla warfare. And so you get the appropriate moment, and it comes in the summer of 1961. And, you see, there had been no crisis — you may not remember back that particular

thirteen years — but at that particular time there was a certain tranquility. And then suddenly the Russians did something, and Kennedy and the administration exploited it. Because the Russians, in June of '61, decided that they would make a peace treaty with East Germany, and consequently definitively recognize East Germany. And though they very categorically said, the Russians did, that in no way would this hinder the approaches to Berlin — that the Americans would not be hindered — it was interpreted that way, as though Berlin would be lost.

And Kennedy made that famous speech on television and radio on the 25th of July of 1961, in which he said that American interest was in grave danger, in which he rallied public opinion for an escalation of American armed forces and for the introduction of new weaponry. Sent to the Congress the next day, the 26th of July, a supplementary appropriations measure, which was passed, \$3.6 billion more added: the armed forces increased from 2.5 to 2.75 million men, and all kinds of new non-nuclear weapons would be added. All of which began an escalation that you find really encapsulated in mid-1964, in this statement of McNamara before the Senate Armed Services Committee: "A 45% increase in the number of combat-ready army divisions, a 44% increase in the number of tactical fighter squadrons, a 75% increase in our airlift capability with a 300-400% increase to come, a 100% increase in general ship construction and to modernize the fleet, and an 800% in the Special Forces trained to deal with counter-insurgency threats. That is our record since this administration has taken office." And that was only in mid-1964.

The other part of it, once you got money, was program. And so, in the summer of 1962, President Kennedy instituted the so-called Special Group on Counter-Insurgency. And that Special Group on Counter-Insurgency was headed by General Maxwell Taylor, and it was comprised of civilian and military experts, and they met every week. That committee, incidentally, continued under Nixon, under the presidency of Secretary of State Kissinger. And consequently, in this earlier period, it met every week with the idea of reviewing everything that had gone on in insurgency activity in the world and proposing programs. And you see what came out of that.

What came out of that was a dialogue: a dialogue between McNamara, the Secretary of State, President Kennedy, and this special group, out of which a strategy was devised. And the strategy rested essentially on four props. And it is, after all, something to take into account. If you are thinking of where the world is going and you do not take this into account, then you leave out one of the most powerful variables in the whole picture. Those four props: First of all, what was called "rapid deployment." Rapid deployment which, after all, came from McNamara's reaction to the things that Che Guevara was saying. Che Guevara, after all, was going about saying that if there were two or three Vietnams, the U.S. would be clobbered and American imperialism would fall; in other words, that what was involved in Vietnam was so outrageous, from the point of view cost, that if you could only mount two or three other simultaneous actions, American

imperialism would be defeated.

And so the purpose of rapid deployment was the time factor. It was the factor of nipping in the bud any such activity, as finally crested and mounted in Vietnam, before ultimately it got to that point. Here is McNamara before the Senate in 1965, right on the eve of the Dominican adventure, saying this: "The first few weeks of a limited war conflict are usually the most critical. Thus, the ability to concentrate our military power in a matter of days rather than weeks can make an enormous difference in the total force ultimately required, and in some cases could serve to halt aggression before it really gets started." And so within the framework of that need for speed, you get a very large economic commitment to the construction of very large transport planes, to the construction of very rapid transport ships, to the development of portable airport equipment — in other words, so that troops can within a matter of hours or days be brought to a trouble spot when that is psyched out, and consequently to subdue it right on the scene. And rapid deployment, a very important and crucial prop of the whole military and political strategy of the United States from the mid-60s down until this time.

The second thing, what became so apparent in Vietnam: what is exquisitely called the electronic battlefield. In other words, the idea being that guerrilla warfare is very, very costly — so costly that the ratio between your standing troops and guerrilla fighters is really almost prohibitively high. In Malaya, for example, when the British had to fight the guerrilla forces of the Malayan insurrectionaries, 8,000 Malayan guerrillas held at bay 260,000 British troops — a ratio of 33:1. And the idea, after all, was to try to reduce that ratio. And also not to have to face the enemy eye-to-eye, because in guerrilla warfare that takes a very heavy and high toll. And so the idea was to try to flush out the guerrilla: to try to know where he was, to try to be able to signal when he was approaching, and then by computer to be able to fire directly in his path.

And so all of the vast electronic equipment and science developed in the universities of America was put at the disposal of this strategy. And you get these very highly sophisticated electronic surveillance devices, electronic detection devices — computerized battlefields — until you get this kind of scene. And I read you, really, something that comes out of an actual text, not out of science fiction. Here is General [William] Westmoreland in 1969 speaking to the Army Association, and with a vision of the future, and a vision that he really held to be quite magnificent: "I see battlefields [*laughter*]: I see battlefields or combat areas that are under 24-hour surveillance of all types; I see battlefields on which we can destroy anything we locate through instant communications and the simultaneous application of highly lethal firepower; in summary, I see an army built around an integrated area control system that exploits the advanced technology of communications, of sensors, of fire direction, and the required automatic data processing right in the field." And Leonard Sullivan — who, as you know, was the man in charge of all Vietnam-oriented Department of Defense research — in 1969 adds this note:

"The developments in sensor technology open up exciting horizons for the future. When one realizes that we can detect anything that perspires, that moves, that carries metal, that involves a noise, or that is hotter or colder than its surroundings, one begins to see a better future. We will instrumentate" — terrible word — "We will instrumentate the entire battlefield. Eventually we will be able to tell when anybody shoots, what he is shooting at, and where he is shooting from. Think of the year 2000 [*laughter*], and you can see an electronic map light up with little lights that flash for different kinds of activity. This is what we require for these porous wars, where the friendly and the enemy seem all mixed up together."

Well, you are dealing, then, with a response, and a response which applies the very highest levels of technology to the whole question of guerrilla warfare. You are throwing mountainous, literally mountainous things, at people that mount movements. And that's something really that you must never forget, because that is so very centrally in the picture.

The third prop, of course: the mercenary apparatus. Because if you are dealing, after all, with guerrilla warfare in far-flung places, you run the risk of a hostile American public that doesn't want to commit its own manpower. You also run the risk that you may give points to the guerrillas by seeming to prop up a regime. And consequently, it's much better to Vietnamize the war, as finally was said: in other words, to create those kinds of domestic or native armies, to equip those armies in order to attack the guerrillas themselves. But what it seems to me is even more important than that threat, because it's so very universal in both the advanced and the underdeveloped worlds, is the building up of police forces, the building up of constabulary to a very, very high degree. And that is important in ways, actually, that General Taylor defined very clearly in his speech to the graduating class at the International Police Academy in 1965.

The International Police had been founded in 1962 by President Kennedy. It was first called the Inter-American Police Academy and was located in Panama City, ultimately brought to Washington and named the International Police Academy. And it was founded by the so-called Office of Police Security, and that Office of Police Security is part of AID, part of the Agency of International Development. And between '62 and 1970, that office expended \$236 million simply to prop up the police forces of the Third World: 100,000 police in Brazil, 90,000 in South Vietnam, and so forth.

And here is General Taylor to the graduating class of this International Police Academy in 1965, speaking of the lessons that he had learned in Southeast Asia: "The outstanding lesson is that we should never let another Vietnam-like situation develop or arise again. We have learned the need for a strong police force and a strong police intelligence agency to assist in identifying the symptoms of an incipient subversive situation. In that endeavor, the police is the first line of

defense." And so what you're saying is that these police forces can flush out the enemy, can flush out the potential subversive simply by its intelligence operation. And Daniel Bell, the Director of AID — of the Agency of International Development — talking in favor of funds for these police forces in 1965 before the Senate, put it very bluntly: "Plainly, the United States has the greatest interest in the maintenance of law and order around the world. We must assist the police of developing nations to meet their responsibilities with the best possible training and equipment, because then they will protect and promote our interest." Now, you see, it could not be blunter than that, placed here before the Senate in 1965.

Add to that a final prop, which comes very close to the kinds of institutions that you have been accustomed to be with and to associate with: and we're talking, of course, about the development of what are called social engineering systems. We're talking about the use of social science, the use of psychology, in order to try to cope with guerrilla warfare. The assumption here — you see, Kennedy was a Harvard man and so very smart — and consequently, the assumption of the Kennedy administration was that maybe, maybe, these Third World liberation struggles couldn't be met just militarily. that maybe there was something political in them; maybe they had identified, after all, these movements, the contradictions in society; maybe they had resolutions for the misery and the poverty. And consequently, what was needed was a way of co-opting that political appeal. What were needed were rural development programs, economic aid, certainly psychological warfare; what were needed were ways of finding out what was wrong in these countries, and making those programs that would mute the discontents, but remain, obviously, inserted in that international division of labor, of which [French theorist] Pierre Jalée has spoken.

And so all of this crested in 1964 and '65 in a famous project, of which you have all heard, called Project Camelot. And Project Camelot, you see, came out of the Office of Research and Development in the Pentagon, and it had a lot of very good academic people in it. The head of Camelot, or Project Camelot, was the chairman of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Brooklyn College, a man named Rex Hooper, and it had a great number of anthropologists mixed up with it. Now, the purpose of this was to develop a four- or five-year project — funded, really, with many millions of dollars — with this particular aim in mind:

"Project Camelot is a study whose objective is to determine the feasibility of developing a general social systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the developing nations of the world. Specifically, its objectives are: first, to devise procedures for assessing the potential for internal war within national societies; secondly, to identify, with increased degrees of confidence, those actions which a government might take to relieve conditions which are assessed as giving rise to potential militant and internal warfare."

In other words, the idea is to find out what the hell is wrong in the country, and then devise programs to take the wind out of the sails, or to mute the potentiality, for something that might be a genuine revolutionary program.

Now, Camelot, as you know, became a cropper, because they chose about sixteen countries (mainly in South America) in which they were going to recruit the local social scientists in order to go around and find out what everybody's attitude was. And that was just magnificent. If you can imagine the Pentagon having an absolute script of that sort in every country — especially a country like Chile which was on the eve, after all, of something rather large in its politics — so that you know where the support comes for radical change; you know what elements really are volatile in the society. Well, there was a Pittsburgh sociologist who went down to Chile and started recruiting various Chilean social scientists, and it got out into the left-wing press in 1965. And the Chileans, being very unreasonable people, decided this was a plan of subversion: that the Americans were in there to find out everything there was about Chile in order to keep it locked within a certain kind of pro-American framework. And consequently, there was a great brouhaha in the press, and Camelot died as a project.

But it didn't die as a concept, because the funds for Camelot were increased, and what you had simply was a subdivision of those particular purposes — simply siphoned off into various think tanks, into various universities; into the University of Wisconsin, among others — for the purpose really of doing this counter-insurgency research, and finding out how you can mute some of the most grotesque discontents, for example, that exist in various societies of the Third World.

I might say, parenthetically, that that's not so very new. That existed also in the 1950s, but it existed in much more muted fashion. And I had the most astonishing confrontation with it. Because, you know, I'm not a terribly naive guy, really, when you get right down to it, and I've been around a little bit, but this sort of startled me. This was in 1956, and I was in my office in Columbus, at Ohio State, and I had come back from Europe, and I had attended the International Historical Congress. You know, it's legitimate — historians meet, there's nothing subversive about that; far from it. And consequently, so I was sitting in my office, and a CIA guy came in. Now, you know, you never know whether to talk to a CIA guy or not, because if you don't, that does nice things for your morale; but if you do, then you may, after all, save somebody who is under interrogation by saying genial things. And consequently, there is always a certain question, so I always ask them what they're interested in before asking them to leave [*laughter*]. And so he said — and he put me off completely — he said, "Well, did you attend the International Historical Congress?" So I said, "Yes... and what's it to you?" [*laughter*]. And he said, "Well," he said — and then he read off a mimeographed sheet, and he said, "Do you know any of these people?" Well, he read off all these names who were Europe's great historians: Lucien Febvre

and Ernest Labrousse and Georges Lefebvre, and so forth, and so the list went all the way down the line. So I said, "I know a few. I happen to know one quite well: Labrousse, he was my old teacher. The others I either know of or I've seen, and so forth. And so what's all this about anyway? What do you want to know? I mean, what are you after anyway?" In the interim, I had found out that his preparation for this kind of surveillance was that he had been an accounting major at Denver University, so he really didn't know much about the subject. Well, he wasn't supposed to tell me what it was about, but I wrenched it out of him [*laughter*]. And basically, what it was about was quite clear, which is: that if the United States had to occupy Western Europe, who in the faculties could they trust?

Well, there's a lot of long-range planning that goes on. And the one in Camelot, you see, was simply a very, very high level procedure of the same sort, but was done in Third World areas at a time when it was absolutely essential to have that kind of lead on every sector of society.

All of which, you see, leads you to some very, very interesting questions. Questions, it seems to me, that you really have to ask yourself, and to which I will return at the very tail end of the course. And they're questions about how much of this kind of infrastructure remains in the world. In other words, if the United States is out of Vietnam, for example, how much remains, after all, of what they have put there by way of counter-insurgency operations? How much remains of American advisors not only in South Vietnam, but in Laos, in Cambodia, in Thailand, in the Philippines? How much remains in the constabulary the world round? And how much, how much of these techniques and this technology have been brought back home? How much is really instilled and installed now at very important places of social control?

And I was talking over the holiday to a great friend of mine who is a psychiatrist in Washington, and he's been at St. Elizabeths [psychiatric hospital] for a number of years. And he's been giving a series of lectures at the Smithsonian Institute, they're absolutely first-class. And what Norman [*here Goldberg might be referring to Norman Rosenberg*] is talking about is the fact that in a society, after all, that has set people up incessantly — set people up on drug charges, for example, simply control populations by the selective use of constabulary against people who are users of soft drugs — Norman's point is that in such a society, there is the most sophisticated, ubiquitous, universal dispensation and use of drugs by the authorities that any society has ever had. Drugs are used from kindergarten on in one manner or another simply to control populations. And consequently, a lot of these things, after all, come out of the laboratory effect that you have in Vietnam and that you have in other Third World areas. Because, you see, Vietnam essentially was a laboratory, and it was a laboratory for two very, very obvious reasons. One, because all the conditions for putting these particular props of a new strategy were available. You had a revolutionary movement that was a real movement, and you had a government that was anti-revolutionary, and you had a Third World population — a non-white

population — so that you didn't have to worry very much about the effects of this strategy, the suffering that it might cause. And so Vietnam was perfect from the laboratory point of view.

But from the second point of view — it was just as important — and that is that Vietnam is part of what Kennedy and the others have called the Pacific Basin Strategy: in other words, in part of that kind of Southeast Asian–Pacific Basin interest, economically — in trade and in investment — to make it as important, certainly, as Latin America is within the framework of the American market. Vietnam was an important prop of that and it wouldn't go down.

Well, you see the point. If you make a laboratory out of something, if you insist that the capacity to keep Third World areas inserted in the international division of labor depends on what you do in that laboratory, then you have to throw everything into the sink in order to wash that particular problem out. And consequently, that happened in Vietnam to the tune of over 500,000 troops, as we very well know.

All of which takes me to the second point, and the point really that I want to make. And it is that, essentially, the problem of the perpetuity of imperialism, or the problem of what the balance of forces are, is shaped by sheer power, on the one hand. But it is shaped by something else. It is shaped, in the second place, by the capacity — or the incapacity — of Third World areas to carry through a genuine revolution. Because, you see, decolonization in the world is not a great problem for American policymakers or for any Western imperialist country. The very fact that a Third World area gets its nominal political independence doesn't guarantee that it's not going to be the seedbed for neo-colonialism, that the Western countries are simply not going to get in there again and simply reduce to the economic terms that they want those particular countries.

What I'm talking about is that pure nationalism — and I pose a question about that in the exam — that pure nationalism by itself, without social revolution, is no guarantee — even if it culminates in political independence — is no guarantee that a Third World country create a barrier against foreign imperialism, or that it can break out of a cycle of underdevelopment. And that really is a crucial theme, and it's something that takes us into another, very large part of the world. Because, you see, we're really talking about India, and we're talking about Egypt, and we're talking about nominally independent countries of South America. We're talking about all of those countries that maintain a nominal political independence but have broken out of that nexus of imperialism, are still inserted in that international division of labor. And perhaps we can illustrate it best in Algeria.

Now, let me tell you something parenthetically. It's a little bit hard for me to talk about Algeria, because Algeria has been a big thing for me in my life, just as Vietnam was a decade later. And it made a lot of sense to me, and I put a lot of whatever I had (which wasn't very much) into the

Algerian cause in the 1950s. I was in France a lot in those days, I was in and out of Algeria several times, and in the course of that period of time I saw something mount that looked really incredible; it looked incredible from up close and from a distance. Because, you see, 125 years after the French had established an empire in Algeria and really reduced that country — or that Algerian nation, if you want to call it that — 125 years later, there was a revolt that began in 1954 in the Aurès Mountains. And that revolt crested into an incredible seven-year war, a seven-year war that really was bitter, and that involved the tremendous mobilization of the Arab masses in Algeria, and finally eventuated in independence in 1962. But, you see, you look at it twelve years later, you look at it now and you see a tremendous and crushing disappointment. You see those millions of unemployed in Algeria; you see Algerian workers who have to flee to France in order to find any work; you see that cycle of underdevelopment which has not been broken out of; you see Western capital seeded in Algeria; you see, really, the question or the problem of whether you can make any kind of viable independence if you don't have a revolutionary program or a revolutionary strategy once that independence is won.

And I'll tell you two things about my own involvement there that are sort of interesting to me; I don't know whether they will be to you or not. One is that I got involved in Algeria because there was nothing to get involved with here at the time, frankly. And I got involved in Algeria very deeply with both French and with Arabs, and I found a tremendous camaraderie. So I began doing the only thing — you know what my thing is. And I talk, so I talk a lot. And I came back and forth from France to America, and I wrote speeches for the Algerian cause. And some of them got picked up on educational radio, and when they got picked up on educational radio they were broadcast all over the place. And finally the FLN gave me some kind of certificate (which I got in 1961, a year before independence was declared), and it's very valuable to me because I can go in and out of Algeria — as an American Jew, it's hard — but I have this certificate, and I have visited Algeria twice since that particular time.

That got me into a lot of flak with the French cops, because they are into a lot of surveillance, and they do watch things. And there's a story that really is so ludicrous that it bears repeating [laughter], but it shows you really how mad these people are who run police forces. Now, it is true that I had been doing things, and I would speak at meetings, and so forth — which you really shouldn't do if you're a foreigner in a country, they don't like it — but to hell! I mean, I'm an internationalist, and I tried to explain that to the cops [laughter], and that doesn't really make any difference. So anyway, they had a dossier. And, you know, listen — I mean, you know, you write an adrenogram on the John Wall and they had you down on a dossier [laughter] — so I wasn't quite surprised about that. But one night while in the Arab Quarter in the 4th arrondissement of Paris (and it was the old Arab-Jewish Quarter, as a matter of fact), and I was eating dinner very late with a friend, and then I was going to walk home, and that after midnight. And I was on a street, and I was on the Rue des Rosiers, and I remember the name as being the

street in which Auguste Blanqui had been shot in 1848. [*Goldberg is mistaken here; Blanqui was shot on the Rue Quincampoix, also in the 4th arrondissement, in 1827*].

Well, the French — well, that was when they made demonstrations, and so the French always put up plaques. So I was there after midnight, and I'm up in this Arab Quarter where there's, to be sure, a lot of contraband being run in and out; this was the period of these *plastiques*, these plastic bombs that they were throwing around. So I'm up there looking this way, and I suppose I wasn't really [*inaudible*]. And anyway, these cops — because there are plainclothes cops all over — they bore down on me, and they said, "What are you doing?" I said, "I'm looking for where Blanqui was shot in 1848" [*laughter*]. And then they took down my code [*laughter*], and they ran me into the police station. And they kept me there all night until the *commissaire* came the next morning. And all morning long, until noon, it was this discussion of, "What is this Groupe Blanqui of which you are a part?" I said, "No, no, no, there is no such Groupe Blanqui — I was looking for the place where Blanqui was shot." Then I dropped it altogether, and I said I had been drinking too much [*laughter*].

But, at any rate, the point of the matter is that that was near nothing, and after that things got very difficult with the police. And that was what part you took — and I had a very tiny, minor part that didn't make any difference — but people who really were involved really were treated very badly. And that torture, that terror that cops imposed in France is something that remains really very much part of that system. And that really, again, gets back to the question of what happens when you draw back from a colonial situation, the kind of repression and instrumentalities that we have brought back from Vietnam.

Well, about Algeria, very simply, very quickly, in terms of a background. Algeria, you know, the history books always tell you the same thing: that Algeria was conquered in June of 1830 by the last of the Bourbon monarchs, Charles X; and that the reason that Charles X went on this expedition is that he was under very heavy attack from the liberals, the constitutionalists, in his own country, and he thought that a short, glorious campaign in North Africa, in the Maghreb, would really solidify him. And consequently, Algiers was conquered within two weeks, and the rest of Algeria was conquered within seventeen years...

[*audio cuts out*]

... already beginning to go through an industrial revolution, there are the tensions and the dislocations that are contingent upon those early industrializations. And consequently, you get General [Maurice-Étienne] Gérard, who is the minister of war under Louis-Philippe in 1831, writing this, which really, in a sense, illustrates the point I'm making: "Our determination to keep Algiers is anchored in the most important of motives: to maintain public order in France by

opening up large markets for trade and for our surplus population." So, then, Algeria always meant something economically to France; it always meant something in terms of settlement, right from the very beginning.

Now, what was the great surprise to the French was that they discovered an Algerian nation. Now, I use that term advisedly, because there is this huge, horrendous debate as to whether an Algerian nation really ever existed — whether you're not dealing really with a tribal society, with a semi-nomadic society that had no national personality. And I simply cite to you the work (which is truly the best work) of Maxime Rodinson, the Arabist in France, and who has demonstrated pretty well that, from whatever measure you use, that there really was an Algerian nation. That is, Algeria was nominally under Turkish suzerainty; that it had a government, that is, the bey of Algeria; it had a tribal organization, and the tribes owned the land. And it had cities: the city of Algiers had 80,000 people at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It had crafts; it had ongoing native industry, in other words, and it was an ongoing community. And the French discovered that when they got to Algeria, because the resistance was terrific.

And that resistance interests us for two reasons. It interests us, first of all, because it tells us why the French were absolutely so brutal in the way in which they not only subdued Algeria, but how they treated the Algerian Arabs from that time on: they simply resented this kind of reaction to what should have been a very short and simple expedition. And secondly, because that resistance is part of a history that has to be recovered much later. You see, it's a terrible thing for Third World peoples to lose their history; it's a terrible thing for them to fight and to strike for them in order to maintain themselves, and then, for long decades and generations, for their own people not to know and have to rediscover that — in another movement, another act, really to rediscover their history, or to rediscover their being.

I tell you that between 1830 and 1871, there was a resistance, a forty-one year resistance, that culminated in that great uprising of the Kabyles mountains in 1871 that finally engaged 100,000 French soldiers and took the lives of 40,000 French soldiers. And that uprising that was scattered over those forty-one years was largely a peasant uprising. They were the peasants who had the sensitivity about losing their land; who sought in the *sénatus-consulte* in June of 1863, which made the land marketable land that could no longer be bought and sold, and no longer land that belonged to the tribes and could not be alienated. They knew that they would lose their land, and lose your land in a country like Algeria, and you have lost your collective personality and all of your economic needs. And that they knew, and those risings were fantastic risings in the period of those forty-one years. And the French had this terribly racist reaction: it's General [Thomas Robert] Bugeaud who sets a scorched-earth policy as the only way you deal with it, it's General [Louis Henri de] Gueydon who brings [head of government Adolphe] Thiers' orders with him in 1871. Thiers tells him to act toward Algeria as we acted toward the [Paris] Commune: in other

words, to repress wherever you have to repress.

Terrific story, that story of those forty-one years. And much of that story centers around the great Algerian heroes, a guy named Abdelkader. And Abdelkader is a kind of genuine folk hero for the Algerian people, because he was the leader, he was the chief — he was the chief in the period of the 1830s and 1840s. Several tribes chose him as leader or chief, he was only 24 years old in 1832 when he became chief. And he organized an Algerian state: with an administration, with a tax-collecting function, with an army conscription function, and he founded foundries so that the Algerian army would have its own weaponry, and so forth. All of that made of Abdelkader really something of a nationbuilder. And he was so successful that the French had to engage in the 1837 in the so-called Treaty of Tafna, in which they recognized that Abdelkader as the ruler of Algeria, presumably gave up the fight. And then they broke the treaty, and ten more very bitter years ensued until Abdelkader was finally defeated by 1847. But it all, you see, feeds into a certain kind of national tradition.

So that the resistance ends by 1871. And then, you see, you can see the contours of what a colonized area is, and the contours have to do with differentials in legal status or inequality before the law. By the Constitution of 1848 of the Second French Republic, Algeria is made three departments of France, and consequently any Frenchman who lives in Algeria is automatically a citizen. But no Arab is a citizen, and they are regulated by what is called the Native Code, and the Native Code is elaborated in 1871. And if you're interested in South Africa and countries of that kind, the Native Code is very similar to what you had in nineteenth-century Algeria, which is not removed until 1944 in the period of the French Liberation. And by that Code, there were forty-one infractions of the law that were listed: being late in paying your taxes, or leaving your residence without permission, or saying insulting things to the French. All of which, you see, gives a tremendous instrument of control or an instrument of repression into the hands of the administrators.

But what is crucial is land, because land is the resource of Algeria. Now, land had been tribal in Algeria. It had never been alienable on the market; the tribes had simply given out, shared out the land to various members of the tribe. But they used it, they didn't own it, so you don't get actual ownership of land — individual ownership of land — until the French get there. And that's very characteristic of the way in which you de-tribalize or disrupt a society, and also the way in which you rip away the leading resource. So it's General Bugeaud in the 1840s who takes over the so-called Turkish land, the land that had belonged to the Turkish crown, and that's given over to the officers of the general who are fighting in Algeria. But the key law is the law of 1863, because the law of 1863 takes the tribal organization and breaks it up. It said that the tribes no longer exist: that we now create the so-called douars, and douars are administrative circles, and within the douars anybody can sell or buy land if he chooses to. And that's supplemented in 1873

by the law of the 26th of July: by the superimposition on Algeria of the French Civil Code, which means that anything you can do in France you can do in Algeria, and that means that all land goes into the market.

Well, you know the result of that. The result is that Westerner gets the land, and the Algerian gets shoved off the land, and that becomes really the basis for the whole problem of underdevelopment. And it's just terrific. You see those *bidonvilles* of Algeria to this very day, and you know what caused that. You see that illiteracy, and then you realize that there was a French general who said in the Chamber of Deputies in 1834 that there are no illiterates in Algeria and every village has a school, and you wonder. And you realize that in 1954, on the eve of that uprising, that the average Algerian Arab had an annual per capita income of \$50 and the average Frenchman of \$700, and that an agricultural worker — and there were 2.5 million who had no land at all, and were agricultural workers or sharecroppers or vagabonds — that they earned 40¢ a day to support a family of six, and that 87% of all Arab urban dwellers in the cities of 1954 lived in one room.

Well, that's the civilizing mission, you see, and that's what imperialism is about. And it's just terrific that people start up again — it's just very tragic that they started up again with all that Arabism and all of that kind of strange mélange of ideological strands, which I'll try to pull apart for you next hour, but that didn't end up, really, to a revolutionary reconstruction. [*applause*]